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I. Introduction
OVERVIEW
At the direction of the Air Sea Battle (ASB) Office, and with the concurrence of the Chief of
Naval Operations, Global ’14 continued to focus on the Air-Sea Battle (ASB) Concept. While
Global ’12 looked at the war fighting implications associated with concept implementation,
Global ’13 and Global ’14 examined the command and control (C2) of cross-domain operations
(XDO) in future Anti-Access/Area-Denial (A2/AD) environments.1 After evaluating the three
possible C2 structures developed in Global ’13 – a functional component commander based
model, a “Domain Commander” based model, and a “Cross-Domain Commander” based
model – a fourth “hybridized” system was proposed using the current functional component C2
structure incorporating specific features identified during Global ’13. This hybrid C2 system was
examined and refined during the February 2014 Global ’14 C2 Workshop, resulting in the
following 4 C2 attributes:
Q

A Combined Joint Force Information Component Commander (CJFICC)

Q

A Combined Joint Force Sustainment Component Commander (CJFSCC)

Q

Cross-Domain Operations Coordination Elements (XDOCEs)

Q

Combined Joint Task Units (CJTUs)

The results of the workshop were provided to a Joint Writing Team, which produced a draft Joint
XDO C2 Concept of Operations (CONOPS). The Global ’14 War Game examined the
implications for C2 authorities and processes as a result of integrating the four new C2 attributes
with today’s C2 structure. The results of this effort were designed to inform the refinement of the
draft CONOPS.
STATEMENT OF THE SPONSOR’S PROBLEM
Current service or component-centric C2 structures at the operational level of war may be
inadequate to effectively execute XDO as envisioned by the ASB concept. While the ASB
concept outlines the need to command and control cross-domain operations which are joint,
networked, and integrated, no organizational structure is proposed; only the requirement that any
suitable structure must be capable of tight, real-time coordination.
1

The Global ’12 Project Report is classified SECRET//NOFORN. Organizations desiring to obtain a copy should
contact the game director (Prof Don Marrin) via SIPRNET e-mail at don.marrin@nwc.navy.smil.mil.
The Global ’13 Project Report is UNCLAS and can be obtained from the U.S. Naval War College Internet web site
at https://www.usnwc.edu/getattachment/Research---Gaming/War-Gaming/Documents/Publications/GameReports/Global-13-Game-Report.pdf.aspx.
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The ability to conduct XDO in a communications degraded or denied environment requires
commanders to exercise authority and direction over assigned and attached forces in real time
while critical information, systems and services are reduced or prevented. To attain the level of
speed and coordination required to outpace the adversary, a commander must be able to direct
and control actions in the air, sea, land, space and cyberspace without having to work through
parallel chains of command. Joint and allied consensus at Global ’13 was that an evolutionary
(not revolutionary) approach will be the most effective in addressing the challenge of C2 in an
A2/AD environment. The assumption is that XDO will be enhanced by the four C2 attributes
contained in the draft XDO C2 CONOPS.
First, the current Joint Task Force (JTF) structure is focused on coordination and unity of
command at the operational level of war. Tactical unity of effort between forces relies
predominately on tactical control (TACON) or short-term support arrangements between forces.
Commanders detecting and reacting to changes at the tactical level must submit requests up
through their service/functional channels when changes must be made which fall outside the
narrow authorities they have been provided via TACON or support relationships. While this
process has been streamlined by technology and decades of experience, it is heavily reliant upon
assured communications. In a degraded or denied communications environment, commanders at
the tactical level will need to coordinate XDO in order to seize and maintain the initiative while
maintaining unity of command and effort. The integration of air, land and maritime C2
organizations requires - at a minimum - common procedures, interoperable communication
systems, and shared education, training and experience. Two of the proposed C2 attributes
address this issue: the XDOCE and the CJTU.
Second, the air, land and maritime environments have functional component commands
established by the JTF Commander and a link to the Joint Force Component Command for
Space. The increased importance of the space and cyber domain, and the growth of forces that
can operate in those domains, require a functional commander to execute operations on par with
the traditional Land Component Commander (LCC), Air Component Commander (ACC), and
Maritime Component Commander (MCC) and to push control of those operations from the JTF
staff or higher headquarters down to the tactical warfighting level. In order to draw all the
information resources from across the domains and employ them as envisioned in the Joint
Electromagnetic Spectrum Operations Concept and the Navy’s concept of Electromagnetic
Maneuver Warfare, the idea of an Information Component Commander (ICC) has been
proposed.
Third, the logistically intensive nature of projecting force against advanced adversary A2/AD
capabilities requires the ability to sustain distributed and dissimilar forces operating in multiple
contested locations throughout the joint operating area (JOA). This problem is compounded
further when decision-making must occur in a time-constrained environment. Various factors
complicate the JTF Commander’s integration effort, such as competing demands for highpriority capabilities (e.g., intra-theater lift, air ports of debarkation (APODs)/sea ports of
debarkation (SPODs), etc.) and the fact that joint force components have different functionoriented approaches, procedures, and perspectives. As a result, a Sustainment Component
Commander (SCC) is envisioned to provide unity of effort for operational sustainment within the
JOA in a contested communications environment.
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STUDY PURPOSE AND OBJECTIVES
The purpose of the Global ’14 Project is to inform the development and refinement of a Joint
XDO C2 CONOPS that describes how to command joint forces while executing cross-domain
operations in future high-intensity A2/AD environments.
Game objectives were used to drive game design and play. The two primary objectives for
Global ’14 were as follows:
Q

Identify any strengths and weaknesses of the four new C2 attributes (SCC, ICC,
XDOCE, CJTU) using established criteria against a near-peer competitor in a high
intensity A2/AD environment; and

Q

Identify improvements to the draft CONOPS and new Mission Essential Tasks (METs).

3
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II. Research Methodology and Game Design
RESEARCH QUESTIONS
Based on the sponsor’s interest in exploring XDO C2, and after extensive review of related
literature, the following research questions were developed for this game:
1. Based on the six C2 criteria employed in this game, how, if at all, does the integration
of the four new C2 attributes (SCC, ICC, XDOCE, and CJTU) strengthen or weaken
the ability to C2 combined forces conducting XDO in a high-intensity A2/AD
environment?
2. What new authorities, processes, responsibilities, and mission essential tasks are
required of the four new C2 attributes in order to plan, direct, monitor, and assess
XDO in a high-intensity A2/AD environment?
3. In what ways does the integration of the four new C2 attributes impact current
command and control authorities, processes, and responsibilities at the task force
(Tier 2), component (Tier 3), and the task unit (Tier 4) levels of command?
DEFINITION OF KEY TERMS
The four terms defined below provided the foundation for the research methodology and game
design employed in this game:
Anti-Access (A2): Those actions and capabilities, usually long-range, designed to prevent
an opposing force from entering an operational area.
Area-Denial (AD): Those actions and capabilities, usually shorter-range, designed not to
keep an opposing force out, but to limit its freedom of action within the operational area.
Cross-Domain Operations (XDO): The use of capabilities in one or multiple domains to
reduce risk and gain or maintain access in another domain.
Command and Control (C2): The exercise of authority and direction by a properly
designated commander over assigned and attached forces in the accomplishment of the
mission.
Player review of the four attributes was guided by a common set of criteria which were derived
from the Joint Operational Access Concept (JOAC) and Milan Vego’s Joint Operational
Warfare Theory and Practice, and subsequently refined and applied during the Global ’13
Project. The resulting criteria consisted of the following:
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Unity of Effort: The C2 construct ensures that all execution decisions and apportionment
requests remain aligned with the operation’s mission and commander’s intent. The
organizational structure fosters a sense of cohesion and unity of purpose from planning to
directing to monitoring to assessing.
Flexibility: The C2 construct is broadly adaptable to a wide range of regions and tasks.
The organization can expand or contract with changing circumstances without serious
loss of effectiveness. It is able to respond to changes in mission and resources.
Information is acquired and passed quickly and reliably to help build the situational
awareness of subordinate, superior and adjacent commands. It exercises decentralized
execution, delegates specific defined functions, and rapidly deploys forces to meet
specific situations.
Simplicity: Chain of command is clear and straightforward. Responsibilities and
authorities are clearly delineated with no overlap. Subordinate commands are responsible
to no more than one superior at any given time. Processes and procedures are
straightforward and foster clear direct communication.
Resiliency: The positive ability of the C2 system or a specific organization to adapt and
overcome setbacks and fill important positions quickly and satisfactorily. This robustness
is also a function of the number of command layers, degree of centralization vs.
decentralization, and reliability of supporting C4ISR systems under degraded, denied or
hostile communications environments.
Operational Integration: A C2 system capable of directing and coordinating high tempo,
distributed, synchronized operations characterized by the use of mission command-type
orders, and decentralized planning and execution at the lowest possible levels across the
force, regardless of service, nationality or physical distances, concentrating their efforts
seamlessly.
Cross-Domain Synergy: A C2 system capable of leveraging capabilities in different
domains such that each enhances the strengths and compensates for the vulnerabilities of
the others in order to establish superiority in some combination of domains that will
provide the freedom of action required by the mission. A high degree of situational
awareness and battle-space sense-making is a necessary enabler.
ANALYTIC METHODOLOGY
As an applied research and evaluation project, the game design for Global ’14 focused on
generating new knowledge related to the strengths and weaknesses of the four C2 attributes, as
well as any changes related to C2 authorities, processes, roles and responsibilities and
organizational composition of the these attributes and today’s C2 structures. Consistent with
Cherry Holmes (1992) and Morgan (2007)2, this approach is interested in identifying the ‘what’
and ‘how’ of potential solutions to real world problems (Patton, 1990), understanding different
expert opinions (Creswell, 2009), and using different forms of data collection and analysis to
corroborate results (Merriam, 2009).
2

Notes on Pragmatism and Scientific Realism; Cleo H. Cherryholmes from Educational Researcher, Vol. 21, No. 6
(Aug. - Sep., 1992), pp. 13-17; and Morgan, D. L. (2007). Paradigms lost and pragmatism regained. Methodological
implications of combining qualitative and quantitative methods. Journal of Mixed Methods Research, 1, 48 – 76.
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A qualitative methods design was used to answer the three central research questions. This study
used triangulation through two or more different data collection and analysis methods to
integrate and confirm findings (Leedy & Ormrod, 2010). This approach commonly employs
distinct quantitative and qualitative methods as a means to compensate for the weakness of one
method with the strength of another. Much of the strength of this approach comes from being
able to draw the same or similar conclusions using different datasets and methods (Creswell,
2009).
Two forms of data analysis were used to describe the qualitative and quantitative data collected
in the study. Qualitative data collected from game tool forms and chat, cell out briefs, Web-IQ
threaded discussion, ethnographic notes and open-ended survey responses relied on content
analysis and grounded theory to discern underlying patterns and themes in the data. Selective, invivo and serendipitous coding with ATLAS.ti software was used with these data. Using the cooccurrence function within the software allowed the game analysts to determine the correlation
between terms and generate game themes and insights. Descriptive analysis of quantitative data
was used to describe the nominal and ordinal measures derived from individual player
questionnaires, ground truth data and player product forms. Statistical analyses of these questions
were conducted using the Analysis ToolPak functions in Microsoft Excel 2010. Qualitative and
quantitative data were analyzed concurrently and then integrated in the interpretation of the
overall results.
GAME DESIGN
Global ’14 was a 1 ½-sided, open intelligence C2 game and used an action-reaction format,
similar to a game of timed chess, with each side acting and reacting in an alternating, sequential
fashion. Whereas Global ’12 focused on the interaction of combat forces, Global ’14 was
designed to address COMMAND – the legal authority exercised over attached and assigned
forces, and CONTROL – the ability to direct the actions of those forces. The Global ’14 analytic
agenda and research objective had nothing to do with the outcome of tactical engagements;
rather it concentrated on the process by which the orders that directed tactical engagements were
drafted, prioritized, resourced, coordinated, communicated and assessed.
A synthetic region known as “Bartland“ was created specifically to support Global ’14. The
region was NOT modeled after any particular real-world geography; rather it contained features
conducive to the investigation of A2/AD challenges (e.g., time, space, and force). The region
contained five countries – Red, Brown, Green, Gray and Purple – representing a spectrum of
military capability and industrial development, and NOT any real-world countries. Australia,
Canada, Great Britain, Japan and the US were collectively referred to as the Blue Coalition, or
simply Blue. Red was the region’s hostile military peer to Blue; Green was the most industrially
advanced and closely supported Blue, while Brown, Gray and Purple reflected varying lesser
degrees of development and support.
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Figure : Bartland
Global ’14 had multiple layers of command, from the Tier 2 Task Force Commander to the Tier
3 Component Commanders to the Tier 4 Task Unit Commanders. Task orders, drafted by Tier 3
based on Tier 2 direction, were transmitted to Tier 4 commanders, interpreted and executed. The
results of those combat interactions were determined in real time by umpires using a rigid, rulesbased adjudication model and witnessed by the task unit commanders, who then sent post-turn
reports back up their chain of command. For Tier 2 and 3, Bartland was represented by a
computer display showing force disposition (though potentially time-late). For Tier 4, the players
were gathered around a large 30' x 36' elevated game map with foam core OOB ‘pucks.’ This
game map represented ground truth.
The C2 System for Global ’14 consisted of two “layers.” A Process Layer, consisting of activities
and pathways to create turn products, interwoven with a Command Layer, composed of command
nodes and the associated authorities and relationships. The specific command nodes and associated
processes were determined using the results of Global ’13 and the draft XDO C2 CONOPS.
Global ’14 gave players the opportunity to experiment with different levels of command delegation.
For the purpose of game play, command authorities were defined as follows:
OPCON: Under OPCON authority, a commander can direct the movement of assigned or
attached forces and assign missions for a period of time at a given place. The commander
is responsible for sustaining the unit and may reorganize subordinate forces.
TACON: Under TACON authority, the commander is limited to executing the assigned
mission at the assigned time and place with the forces provided.
TACON Plus: Under TACON Plus (TACON+), the commander may change the
assigned mission, time and place for assigned or temporarily attached forces, based on
the situation and his understanding of commander’s intent.
8

Research Methodology and Game Design
Cell Structure and Participants
Global ’14 used a multi-cell configuration for the Blue team. Each cell represented a
headquarters staff at either the Task Force Commander (Tier 2) level, one of five Component
Commanders (Tier 3, or an aggregation of Task Unit Commanders at the Tier 4 level. With the
exception of Tier 4-to-Tier 4 commands, cells did not interact face-to-face; instead they relied on
a communications and data network which was susceptible to enemy intrusion and interference.
Blue team membership was drawn from across the DoD enterprise. A USN O-8 led the Blue cell
which consisted of approximately 60 joint US, British, Canadian, Australian and Japanese
players.
The Red team was manned by the War Game Department’s (WGD) Office of Naval Intelligence
Detachment (ONI-Det). As Global ’14 was a 1 ½ sided game, the Red team worked in concert
with White/Control team, using a combination of free play, pre-scripted events and dynamic
injects to ensure game play adequately addressed the various research questions.
The White cell consisted of primarily WGD personnel as assisted by external participants to
represent Tier 1 commands as necessary (geographic combatant commander, TRANSCOM,
CYBERCOM, STRATCOM and National Command Authority).
See Section III. Demographics and Annex A: Player Manning by Cell) for specific cell
membership information.
Game Play
Global ’14 used an action-reaction style of play. Blue and Red submitted their moves in an
alternating fashion, with each turn cycle taking approximately four hours to complete. A nominal
four-hour turn cycle consisted of the following:
0+00

Integrated Task Order (ITO) submitted from Tier 3 to Tier 4.3

0+00 – 1+00

Adjudication of submitted ITO; forces moved by Tier 4 per ITO.

1+00 – 2+00

Adjudicated continued; offensive action from ITO resolved with
defensive actions from opponent. Outcomes reported to Tier 3 by Tier 4.

2+00

ITO submitted from opposing side.

2+00 – 3+00

Adjudication of submitted ITO; forces moved by Tier 4 per ITO.

3+00 – 4+00

Adjudication continued; offensive action from ITO resolved with
defensive actions from opponent. Outcomes reported to Tier 3 by Tier 4.

4+00

Cycle repeats.

Play did not stop during adjudication. While Tier 4 were carrying out orders and combat outcomes
were being determined, Tier 2 and 3 continued to assess previous moves, update target lists, adjust
apportionment, allocate and coordinate forces and draft tasking orders for the next turn.
3

The Integrated Task Order (ITO) was a game product used to communicate a Tier 3 commander’s orders to their
Tier 4 CJTU and TU commanders.
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In order to bring players unfamiliar with the game mechanics ‘up to speed’ (also known as
‘leveling up’), initial moves were pre-built to allow players to first learn how to use the game
tool to submit moves (without having to build the move, in this case Blue Turn 0), then modify
and submit an existing move (Blue Turn 1), and finally create and submit their own move (Blue
Turn 2 and beyond). Over the course of the week, this resulted in six complete turns.
Blue players were able to recommend changes to authorities or processes to the Blue Cell Lead
at any time for possible adjustment of the C2 system in order to improve unity of effort,
simplicity, flexibility, resiliency, operational integration, or cross domain synergy.
After each turn, individual cell leads completed an End of Turn survey; after the last turn of each
day, all participants completed an End of Day survey. An End of Day Plenary was moderated by
WGD personnel and provided a forum for Blue players to discuss topics of interest surfaced
through game play, such as authorities, processes, roles and responsibilities, and force
distribution.
The Final Plenary provided the TF Cell and each Tier 3 and Tier 4 game cell the opportunity to
out-brief their observations regarding the four attributes and their effect on current C2 structures
and processes, as well as evaluate and discuss the overall effectiveness of the four attributes with
regard to the C2 criteria, assisted by analytic hierarchy process (AHP) software, a pair-wise
comparison decision aid.
Game Tool
The Global ’14 Game Tool consisted of two parts which essentially acted like a web-based email
system with attachments. Move forms were completed and sent to other game cells via a network
email system. Which forms a command could create and to whom they could send them was a
function of the command’s roles, responsibilities and authorities.
The primary means of coordination between command cells was chat. There were various chat
rooms available, depending on player role and command assignment. Both email delivery and
chat was impacted by network loading and communications degradation. Control was able to
modify network speeds as a function of bandwidth, file size, offensive and defensives cyber
network actions, jamming and satellite status. This had a direct impact on the players’ ability to
pass the information required to support game play.
A total of 14 different types of orders and forms were used over the course of play to nominate
and prioritize targets, apportion effort, request support, allocate force, task subordinate units,
coordinate fires, and report combat results. Additionally there were forms to request and
promulgate changes to the C2 system in terms of delegated authorities, senior-subordinate
relationships, attached forces, etc.4

4

A listing and explanation of each of the game forms is provided as Annex B.
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Adjudication
Turns alternated between Blue and Red, with one team with the initiative/attack and the other
reacting/counter-attack. The roles then reversed. Units possessed varying amounts of combat
power across seven warfare areas:
Q

Cyber Operations

Q

Counter-Space Operations

Q

Anti-Air Warfare

Q

Ballistic Missile Defense

Q

Naval Surface Warfare

Q

Undersea Warfare

Q

Strike Warfare (Included all combat against ground based targets)

Combat was primarily limited to units occupying the same map-square; certain long range
weapons could be employed beyond the square occupied by the shooter, though required overthe-horizon targeting support. Simplified C2 networks and “kill chains” were developed,
particularly for Red A2/AD weapons, allowing Blue to exercise disrupt-destroy-defeat options.
Outcomes were ultimately determined by WGD umpires using a probability based aggregated
fires model based on a set of pre-determined rules, and directly observed by the Tier 4 players.
Along with traditional kinetic warfare, both sides were able to conduct cyber operations exploitation, offensive and defensive - as well as space operations involving targeting and
communication satellites which were susceptible to various counter-space attacks.
Sustainment play tracked fuel, ammunition and supply status of each unit via a forces database
and map displays. Supplies were stored in depots in numerous locations and moved via air and
seaborne lift as well as ground transport. Engineering units were able to establish expeditionary
airfields and forward arming and refueling points and repair damaged airfields and ports.
LIMITATIONS OF GAME DESIGN AND ANALYSIS
A major challenge for the War Gaming Department concerns development of a game that
provides the robust insights into an issue or problem sought by the game’s sponsor. Accordingly,
managing stakeholder expectations about what the final game report will tell them with respect
to broad-based implications is essential. Stakeholders often seek findings that will provide them
with predictive conclusions for decision-making purposes. Gaming is predominately a
descriptive process, not an experiment. Even if a game is repeated, it lacks sufficient controls to
ensure validity. Sponsors should not attempt to draw inferences beyond what the specific players
did in Global ’14 in terms of generalizability (the ability to apply the findings observed for a
small population to the broader world around us).
Global ’14 play did not execute exactly as designed. During the game’s development phase, the
adjudication rules supporting Tier 4 play grew in complexity, and the game became very Tier 4
focused despite the higher interest in Tier 2 and 3 decisions. Consequently, many of the shortcomings in execution tend to be related to Tier 4 and the CJTU attribute.
11

U.S. Naval War College Global 2014 Report
Design Limitations
CJTUs were not purpose built by the players at game start. To support the commencement of
game play, the Control team provided the initial CJTU assignments and composition, ensuring
that all of the Tier 3 component commands had at least 1 CJTU under their command.
Unfortunately, this appeared to frustrate the players, since they didn’t understand the rationale
behind why particular CJTUs had been formed. That said, they tended to use them without
significant modification from what was initially provided by the Control team, even though they
had the capability to alter the composition of their assigned CJTUs and TUs.
Having all of the Tier 4 players together in one room provided them with perfect theater-wide
situational awareness. This was a result of the one common game map, which was originally
developed to accelerate adjudication and feedback for the Tier 3 players. As a result, Tier 3 was
quick to delegate authority to Tier 4, due to their superior situational awareness (in terms of force
disposition) and ability to coordinate face-to-face with their Tier 4 colleagues. Having each Tier
4 in a separate cell with only awareness of their local area was considered during design, but was
rejected as it would likely have significantly slowed the tactical play and adjudication.
There were not enough Tier 4 players to effectively move all the OOB pieces. A single Tier 4
player could have control of traditional task units, as well as CJTUs with varying levels of
delegated control (OPCON, TACON or TACON+). Despite color coding to distinguish differing
levels of command authorities, it was difficult to enforce use limitations based on authority.
Hence all Tier 4 players essentially exercised TACON+ over their forces, whether or not that
was the actual delegated authority, making analytic evaluation of differences in authority
difficult.
As time grew tight and communications degraded, move forms became increasingly
incomplete. While less specific ‘mission type orders’ were anticipated under these
circumstances, players began taking shortcuts and omitting data from reports, particularly at the
Tier 4 level (reference Tier 4 manning comment above). As a result, data streams connected to
the relationships between XDOCE, ICC, SCC and CJTU decisions were significantly
diminished.
Analysis Limitations
It should be noted that both the quantitative and qualitative datasets analyzed in this game report
lack generalizability due to the small sample sizes of participants—none of whom were
randomly selected from a population known to be normally distributed. However, through
triangulation and meta-analysis, researchers enhanced the reliability and validity of findings that
should prove valuable to inform both the sponsor and players about XDO C2.
This game was designed to be highly inductive in order to garner broad-based insights relative to
the research questions. Inductive games leverage qualitative data to identify themes based on
player decisions during game play. The qualitative nature of data can result in subjective
findings. To control for the subjectivity and complexity of the research area, a number of design
and analysis measures were employed. The participants in this game represented an accessible
and purposeful sample to provide information-rich data. In this report, the findings are limited to
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the analysis of Global ’14 game data, supplemented by the collective wisdom of the Global
Project Team, based on their 3 years examining the ASB concept.
Two threats to internal validity concern the quality of the data collected and the accuracy of the
analytical techniques used to review these data. To ensure quality data collection, the post-game
analysis team relied on player-created products, such as game tool products, individual survey
responses, and final cell out-briefs. Insights extracted from these data sources were subsequently
cross-checked, or triangulated, with other data sets including ethnographer notes to ensure
accuracy and conclusiveness. The accuracy of the analytical techniques was enhanced by using
multiple methods, tools, and researchers to review the same data. Methods included content
analysis, grounded theory, and descriptive statistics. Multiple research teams reviewed the same
data sets using different approaches. Themes and insights derived from multiple researchers and
approaches reflect more validity than a single researcher using a single approach.
To explore the degree of external validity, one must consider whether the data collected can be
generalized across the population of subjects. The demographics of the participants provide some
measure to assess this attribute. The game was designed to stimulate critical thinking and
analysis and sought players from different warfare areas, services and nations. Although the
game had a diverse group of participants, it proves to be cost-prohibitive and too complex to
have every perspective represented from all stakeholders across the joint community. Therefore,
some gaps in perspectives can be assumed for any game, including Global ’14.
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III. Demographics

Number	
  of	
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U.S. and international participants were sought based on their warfare experience and service
affiliation. The subsequent demographic statistics were compiled from self-reported responses
garnered from the online registration site and the individual player questionnaire administered at
the beginning of the game. The 75 players who contributed demographic data consisted primarily
of mid to senior-level military and civilian officials from the United States (56 players),
Australia (6 players), United Kingdom (6 players), Japan (4 players), and Canada (3 players).
International players were primarily distributed throughout the Tier 3 cells to ensure coalition
perspectives were represented during cell deliberations. Each branch of service and functional
area of expertise was adequately represented during the game; Navy (34), Air Force (21), Army
(13), and Marine Corps (7). 37 players held the rank of O-5/GS-14, 17 held the rank of O-6/GS15, 16 held the rank of O-4/GS-13, 3 held the rank of O-3/GS-12, 1 held the rank of O-7, and 1
player held the rank of O-8. Figures 2 and 3 depict the number of participants by branch of
service and warfare specialty across player game cells.
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IV. Findings and Recommendations
This section of the report addresses implications to the draft Joint XDO C2 CONOPS related to
each of the four C2 attributes, and provides corresponding findings and recommendations. Player
derived themes and phrases from game data (e.g., Web IQ Threaded Discussion, Final Cell
Presentations, chat, products and forms, and ethnographic notes) were coded and analyzed to
identify concepts relevant to informing the game’s objectives. The analytic team used grounded
theory and content analysis to identify patterns across data streams in order make general
statements related to strengths and weaknesses, organizational composition, roles and
responsibilities, authorities and processes, and mission essential tasks for each of the four C2
attributes. In this way, emergent themes were grounded both empirically (in the data) and
conceptually to the wider analytic context of the CONOPS.
COMBINED JOINT FORCE INFORMATION COMPONENT COMMANDER (CJFICC)
Strengths And Weaknesses
“The main benefit for the CJFICC is putting many of those things that exist
behind ‘black doors’ under a person that has the clearances and understanding to
pull them together.”
– Global ’14 Player comment
Enhancing Unity of Effort and Operational Integration
Finding 1.1: Players at the Tier 2 and 3 levels generally viewed the CJFICC concept as
enhancing unity of effort and operational integration by integrating and synchronizing
cybernetic, electronic warfare, space and information operations (though information operations
outside of cyber and EW were not examined as a limitation of game design).
Discussion: As the complexity and ability of cyber, space, EW and information operations to
significantly impact the battle grows, the players indicated that there needs to be a specific
commander who is responsible to provide that type of support to the traditional component
commanders, and that the CJFICC is one potential way to address that need. Players stated that
the operational-level view of peer component commander operations enabled the CJFICC to
arrange and sequence support in alignment with CJTF objectives, and the broader view of the
Information Environment “enabled integrated support to multiple domains towards common
objectives.”
“The CJFICC definitely enhances synchronization of limited cyber assets to
support the warfighter ...timing and massing of forces against a very competent
adversary. Clearly brings to bear cyber assets both within and outside the JOA”
– Global ’14 Player comment
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By design, the CJFICC concept integrates cyber, space and EW effects. Many players saw the
synchronization value between CJFICC and other components to coordinate actions to optimize
cyber, space and EW effects and improve utilization of low density/high demand capabilities.5
However, some players debated the degree to which the CJFICC contributed to operational
integration, countering that the CJFICC added an additional unnecessary layer of complexity,
since US Cyber Command (CYBERCOM) already provides support to the joint force.
Furthermore, if CYBERCOM was to create a component commander, it could potentially
resemble an upside-down pyramid, consisting of a large staff in charge of a relatively few
number of actual forces. Some participants also stated that effects integration was ineffective
during the game, with one player stating that “effects continued to be misaligned [between the
components] throughout game play” and that this could have been alleviated if the CJFICC
functions were devolved back to the other components.
Players concluded that national constraints and restraints for integrating multinational cyber
forces into the CJFICC warrant further investigation. They highlighted the need to better
understand the implications associated with providing TACON plus to allied forces operating
in CJTU constructs. To address these issues, players concluded that integrating allies early in
the planning process to plan offensive and defensive cyber operations is critically important
to executing cross-domain operations. Moreover, players concluded that the CJFICC should
expand bi-lateral and multilateral information sharing related to cyber plans, capabilities,
and effects with allies and partners prior to conflict, as well as build the relationships and
processes to protect partner communication networks.
Recommendation 1.1: Not applicable (No CONOPS modifications are required).
Cross-Domain Synergy through Shared Expertise and Understanding
Finding 1.2: Similar to the argument for operational integration, the CJFICC was seen as
inherently cross-domain due to its domains of responsibility (cyber-domain, space domain), but
confusion exists to what exactly is meant by ‘cross-domain operations.’
Discussion: Though players generally thought that the CJFICC contributed significantly to
cross- domain operations, they appeared to struggle to grasp what was and was not ‘crossdomain,’ even though definitions and examples as it pertained to the game were provided. Some
favorable cross- domain comments were actually more applicable to joint - vice cross-domain operations. Other players equated intel gain-loss deconfliction or synchronization as equivalent
to cross-domain operations. Still others offered that an “information domain” was more
appropriate than a cyber domain. One player provided an interesting take on the difficulty of
cross-domain operations and why it may currently be the case, stating “...the game cannot drive
us to cross-domain solutions because perhaps we do not have the toolsets yet to genuinely think
that way.”

5

As mentioned earlier, not all aspects of Information Operations were exercised and therefore not integrated; for
example, there was no deception plan, since the open information nature of game play made such activities
irrelevant.
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To fully leverage a cross-domain approach amongst the component commanders, better insight
into CJFICC capabilities is required. Players, mostly at the Tier 4 level, suggested that they did
not have visibility into either CJFICC capabilities or effects, and that coordination via the
XDOCE was weak. Players concluded that the CJFICC must balance between the offensive
and defensive requirements between component commanders to gain the requisite
operational effects across the joint force. Players viewed cyber as a key enabler to
generating effects in other domains and emphasized the need to better understand the
CJFICC’s campaign plan and how the effects of each component commander are integrated
and synchronized across multiple missions and lines of operation. To effectively employ
joint and combined cyber capabilities in cross-domain operations, players concluded that
joint planning staffs at the operational and tactical levels need to better understand how
operations in a given domain influences cyber operations, how cyber capabilities can
achieve kinetic and non-kinetic effects in other domains, and secondary and tertiary effects
that impact future operations. In any case, the XDOCE role was deemed as critical to enabling
CJFICC contribution to cross domain operations, both from a having CJFICC community
expertise embedded in other component commands, as well as traditional warfare expertise
embedded in the CJFICC.
Recommendation 1.2: The CONOP should include an illustrative example of cross-domain
operations in order to help readers gain a better appreciation for what is meant by cross-domain
operations.
Authorities And Processes
Delegating Authorities under the CJFICC Construct
Finding 1.3: USSTRATCOM may be more inclined to delegate space and cyber authorities to a
CJFICC as the single commander with a similar mission set.
Discussion: Some players saw an increased likelihood that authorities would be delegated under
a CJFICC construct, as space and cyber authorities are already under USSTRATCOM, which
would be more inclined to delegate to a single commander with a similar mission set.
Insomuch as the players saw value in the CJFICC, many had severe reservations about the
CJFICC’s actual ability to exercise command or be given authorities over many of the strategic
assets it wielded in the game. The following player comment best summarizes this assertion.
There is potential to develop this concept. However, in order to make it a reality,
the [Department of Defense] and interagency will have to come to a consensus on
authorities and responsibilities. Today, cyber and space fall under
USSTRATCOM per the Unified Command Plan. There is still debate about
making USCYBERCOM a functional combatant command ... There is merit to
having a non-air component within the JTF focused on providing AOR-specific
effects... but theatre space and cyber effects must be weighed against global
impacts. This consideration requires close coordination with national agencies
and HHQ [higher headquarters] along with significant delegation of authorities
to the JTF level which are today held by [the president] and [secretary of
defense].
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Several players identified the potential for undesired impacts outside the JOA as making the
delegation of authorities difficult at best without some proven means of control. As one player
noted: “The challenge of authorities is central. Because of the potential strategic [second and
third] order effects getting authorities will be difficult even at the CJTF level.” Other players
countered that while authority delegation will always be a challenge, “We can’t just accept that
permissions and authorities are hard to get at the operational level. We need to change that now.”
Additional players noted that “... not all authorities will be delegated in our lifetimes. But cyber,
EW, and information ops authorities already exist at component levels. The CJFICC idea is to
put them under a single commander in theater ...to which both signals and cyber authorities can
be delegated ...nothing about limitations on authorities undermines this idea.”
The CJFICC will need these permissions prior to conflict, as getting the authorities during a
conflict will be time consuming. The following player comment highlights this finding:
“Time to bring the comprehensive, centrally managed capabilities that CJFICC
represent [in order to] gain more timely/rightly focused authorities from Tier 0
and manage the authorities from a JFC perspective and apply CJFICC resources
efficiently horizontally and vertically throughout the JFC’s organization.”
The CONOP currently states that “Unless cyberspace effects are pre-planned and pre-approved,
authorization may be too cumbersome to be realistically available for tactical employment.
Coordinating through operational and strategic level commands adds communication layers and
time. A communication contested environment will make already cumbersome coordination
highly impracticable for dynamic warfighting situations.”
The CONOP further states that “The CJFICC is given the authority necessary to accomplish the
missions and tasks assigned by the JFC,” which seemingly over-simplifies a significant
challenge to the practicality of the CJFICC concept, even though the CONOP goes to great
length to delineate many of the authorities which currently govern cyber, space and EW
operations.
Recommendation 1.3: The CONOP should clearly define the authorities needed by the CJFICC
to operate as envisioned, as well as appropriate control measures to minimize the effects of
undesired impacts outside the JOA (the specifics of this recommendation are beyond the
classification and scope of this report). USCYBERCOM’s “Emerging Joint Concept for
Cyberspace” may provide additional insights for CONOP inclusion.
Controlling Information and Electronic Warfare Assets
Finding 1.4: Whether OPCON, TACON or ‘TACON-plus, players identified the need to better
define how cyber, information and electronic warfare assets will be controlled, by whom and
under what command authority.
Discussion: Players questioned the right level of authority delegation across the tiers, from
USSTRATCOM (Tier O) down to the task units (Tier IV). Who decides? In general, players
tended to favor as much delegation as possible as low as possible. While some players asserted
that the CJFICC functions should reside at Tier II, others countered that it is critical to have
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CJFICC integration at the Tier III level in order to operationalize these capabilities, realizing that
this will require work to resolve authority and process issues that currently exist.
By having the CJFICC as a Tier III commander, CJFICC members saw themselves as an “equal
player” to the other component commanders, and were able to influence courses of action during
planning, vice attempting to bring supporting capabilities to bear after the fact. Additionally this
brought the CJTF commander non-kinetic effects that he otherwise would not have had under his
control, alleviating the requirement to send requests up the chain of command which would have
further complicated synchronization.
During game play, Tier 3 entities tended to delegate ‘TACON-plus’ authority to their
subordinate Tier IV commands. Several players likened ‘TACON-plus’ as being the “easy
button.” One player postulated “that is an indication that such level of authority is the right way
ahead. Pushing down authority (aligns) with mission command and with ops in an A2/AD
environment against a competitor with comms degrading capability. Recommend continuing
exploration of ‘TACON-plus’...may be absolutely necessary in future ops.”
Recommendation 1.4: Continue to develop the CONOP with the CJFICC as a Tier III level
command. The authorities and command relationships between the Tier III CJFICC and its Tier
II superior and Tier IV subordinates warrants further investigation. Currently the CONOP
discusses OPCON and TACON relationships for forces under the CJFICC. Continue
investigation of ‘TACON-plus’ or similar modification of existing command authorities as an
effective means of exercising command over attached units complimentary to mission command,
to include the requirement for command relationships to be specified using establishing
directives in order to clearly articulate which OPCON-related command authorities should be
delegated to the Tier 4 level to enable mission success.
Cyber Authorities and CJTF
Finding 1.5: The CJTF commander would benefit from having some level of cyber operations
directly under his control and the CJFICC could “provide the bridge from national/strategic-level
assets to the operational level.” However, additional roles and responsibilities of the CJFICC are
not well understood.
Discussion: Which roles and responsibilities should be retained at higher levels such as
USSTRATCOM vice which should be assumed by in-theater commanders, and which should be
combined under a single commander formed the core of the player discussions.6
Some players stated that too many missions were assigned to the CJFICC, and that cyber
operations alone would consume a component commander’s staff. Others argued for an
incremental approach to CJFICC development, e.g. start with cyber operations and then expand
to other information environment related missions. Which missions should be added, however,
was not clear. Some advocated that cyber and information operations were logical fits, others
that cyber and EW were better combined under the CJFICC.
6

Note that the game was not designed to ‘test’ the ability of the players assigned to the CJFICC to perform all the
potential tasks associated with cyber, space, EW and information operations as a measure of the utility of the
concept or appropriateness of the assigned missions.
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Even within information operations, some tasks may be better served under the CJFICC than
others, but for each player in favor of a role for the CJFICC, there was another opposed. For
example, while one player suggested that operational deception would be an appropriate mission
for the CJFICC (currently included in the CONOP), another countered that CJFICC should NOT
be the JTF planner for deception, stating that “planning, managing, and executing a deception
plan for the JTF will consume all of the energy for the CJFICC and the important needs of
synchronizing cyber and EW into the fight will be left out.”
Fundamentally the players identified the need to “determine which parts of the information
environment are best served by a component commander ...what elements are essential to
Information Dominance in support of warfighter objectives.” The diversity of the functions,
authorities, and capabilities proposed for the CJFICC suggested to some players the need to
coordinate those efforts under a central entity for synergy and unity of effort. For others, that
diversity argued for NOT consolidating the missions under a single commander:
“Space, cyber and strategic/operational EW are currently very different functions
with sets of problems in authorities and capabilities that require a wide range of
expertise. Putting them together outside of an operational commander such as
CJTF only adds additional demands on already strained formations without the
proven benefit of any real results.”
– Global ’14 Player comment
While the Problem Definition portion of the CONOP states that “effects from both space and
cyberspace domains can provide value and create cross-domain synergy for tactical forces,” the
Solution section does not make a specific case for why the two domains of cyberspace and space
should be grouped together under one commander, stating simply that “The CJFICC is
envisioned to be responsible for the integration and employment of assigned, attached, and/or
forces available for tasking in the space and cyber domains…,” nor does it justify why
Information Operations (IO) are also to be included. The “interrelationship” argument made
between cyber and space (space assets give cyber systems global reach, cyber systems control
space assets), and similarly between cyber operations and EW are (1) not included in the
Problem/Solution section (but instead in the later Space and Cyber Domain section), and (2) are
not sufficiently compelling.
Recommendation 1.5: Focus the CJFICC roles and responsibilities specifically to cyber
operations, while continuing to evaluate the utility of shifting SCA and IO responsibilities to a
dedicated component commander. If the decision is made to retain IO and/or SCA
responsibilities under the CJFICC, then revise the CONOPS (particularly the Problem and
Solution sections) to include a compelling rationale that considers both the challenges (and
opportunities) that such a C2 arrangement would create.
Organizational Composition
CJFICC vs. Current C2 System
Finding 1.6: While there was general agreement that the functions of the CJFICC as presented in
the game need to be integrated, there were conflicting arguments as to whether a single
command was the best way to accomplish this integration.
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Discussion: Those supporting the CJFICC organizational construct cited advantages in terms of
parity in planning vis-a-vis other component commanders, provided a bridge to connect national
assets to operational effects, and the ability to synchronize otherwise disparate information
effects. Others postulated that the same level of integrated effects could be achieved using
existing C2 structures, and a new separate CJFICC staff was neither required nor desired.
The primary argument in support of the CJFICC component level organization is that without a
central “information domain champion with a seat at the table” able to coordinate efforts from
Tier 0 down to Tier 4, it simply does not happen. Cyber, Space, EW and information operations
now run through such a wide variety of organizations with differing authorities, classification
levels, approval processes, and employment timelines that synchronized operations within the
information environment, let alone in concert with traditional kinetic operations, is highly
unlikely. The CJFICC can best provide the operational-level integration of these capabilities in
support of CJTF objectives. The following player comments highlight the perceived utility of the
CJFICC attribute:
“The main benefit for the CJFICC is putting many of those things that exist
behind “black doors” under a person that has the clearances and understanding
to pull them together.”
“Putting the CJFICC at Tier 3 level brings the discussion into mainstream
operations discussions and avoids it becoming a collateral duty for another. It
also avoids IW capabilities being considered after-the-fact.”
In order to integrate effects throughout the task force, the CJFICC “must have all associated
subject matter experts/XDOCEs and staffing in order to be effective.” Rather than a new
command, some players countered that the functions of the proposed CJFICC could be carried
out just as well, if not better, under existing command structures (J2, J3/J5, and J6) supported by
robust LNOs. The following player comment supports this viewpoint:
“Strongly believe the CJFICC needs to be a subordinate part of J3/J5 to
accomplish the integration that ensures CJFICC capabilities are used effectively.
I do not see the need for a separate CJFICC; rather, the CJFICC should be rolled
into J3/J5 Ops/ Plans.”
Recommendation 1.6: Continue to examine and refine the CJFICC concept, focusing on its role
as the functional component commander for cyber operations, to include an examination of the
JFHQ-Cyber construct for possible organizational insights for a cyber-related Tier 2 and Tier 3
command structure.
The Role of the XDOCE and CJFICC
Finding 1.7: Specific to the CJFICC, the XDOCE could be an effective pathway to get
information out from ‘behind the green door” and demystify the ‘magic’ associated with cyber
operations.
Discussion: In terms of the other three C2 attributes - CJTU, SCC and XDOCE – the XDOCE
was the one most discussed in connection with the CJFICC, though comments tended to conflate
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XDOCEs with more traditional LNOs. 7 The degree to which the CJFICC was able to integrate
effects across the task force via their XDOCE was hampered in no small part by the way the
players attempted to employ the new concepts. The player comment below indicates that they
wanted to look at the problem differently, but lacked the knowledge and situational awareness to
do so:
“We haven’t done good integration because we’re playing the OLD way. We’re
NOT looking at RISK and using a different force than our own to perform a
mission with less risk. We’re trying to hit every nail with our OWN hammer. If I
had that visibility, I would have USED a different cross domain asset, but I didn’t
have that understanding or SA. Without an understanding of [the] cyber
component, [I can’t] say ‘do I think there is a cyber-capability that will enable me
to do my job with less risk.’ “
The CONOP currently discusses the role of the XDOCE vis-à-vis the CJFICC. It suggests that
“The CJFICC should establish XDOCEs with other commander’s headquarters to better integrate
information operations with the JFC’s overall CONOPS. The XDOCEs will help facilitate
information operations to the lowest tactical level in accordance with the JFC’s joint information
operations plan.”
Recommendation 1.7: Not applicable (No CONOPS modifications are required).
The Role of the CJFICC and Sustainment
Finding 1.8: The “CJFICC could be a great asset for logistics.”
Discussion: With logistics and sustainment so communications-intensive, and since the
associated networks are susceptible to degradation and/or intrusion, a CJFICC could add value
by centrally managing theater network defensive operations in order to improve network
reliability and security.
Recommendation 1.8: Not applicable (No CONOPS modifications are required).
The role of the CJFICC and Intelligence
Finding 1.9: Players took both sides of the argument regarding the nature of the relationship
between the CJFICC and Intelligence. The argument over Intel and its relationship to the
CJFICC is in no small part due to the conflicting definitions and usage of terms like ‘information
warfare,’ ‘information environment,’ ‘information domain,’ ‘information operations,’ and
‘information dominance’ and the role intelligence plays in each.
Discussion: Some players stressed that “Intel is definitely part of the CJFICC. Unity of effort
principles would point out that Intelligence must be with the Information Component
Commander,” while others countered with “CJFICC is not JIOC,” and “Intel needs to support
CJFICC but [isn’t] ...‘part’ of the CJFICC. There needs to be a theater/component/JTF/CC
intelligence presence providing broad [situational awareness] and specific support (CJFICC is

7

This highlights the difficulty in playing multiple new concepts with inexperienced players in the same game
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one of those elements) but subordinating Intel to the CJFICC would negatively impact all the
other components, et al.”
Recommendation 1.9: Early discussions of CJFICC missions included an intelligence role, but
later workshops concluded that the CJFICC was a consumer of intelligence like any other
component commander. While no specific change to the CONOP with regard to Intelligence is
recommended, the previous recommendation to reduce reliance on terms like information
operations and information warfare is germane.
CROSS-DOMAIN OPERATIONS COORDINATION ELEMENT (XDOCE)
Strengths And Weaknesses
“XDOCE needs work, but it has promise. Some will want to hand-wave it away,
but with a real understanding of the threat environment…it has potential to allow
better joint force employment against a near-peer in a comms denied
environment.”
– Global ’14 Player
Enhancing Cross-Domain Synergy
Finding 2.1: The XDOCE could serve as a “forcing function” to improve cross-domain
operations in an A2/AD environment.
Discussion: The access challenges created by an adversary employing A2/AD capabilities
may require the use of cross-domain capabilities to gain operational access. Players
concluded that the XDOCE could serve as a “forcing function” to enhance the integration
and application of capabilities from different services within a domain to gain or main
access in another domain. Players emphasized that the XDOCE should contribute to the
planning, directing, monitoring, and assessment of cross-domain operations on
command staffs at the JTF, Component Commander, and task unit level. As one
player noted: “As an XDOCE member, I learned we had responsibilities to quickly coordinate
XD [cross-domain] operations in order to feed the planning process for my assigned domain.”
The contribution of the XDOCE at the Tier 3 level is highlighted by the following
player comment:
“I think we’re not looking at XDOCE from the right angle. We shouldn’t value its
role based on the ability to shift capabilities from one domain to another but
rather the value of assessing who is better postured with forces and authorities to
optimize the right effect which results in conditions being sought by the
Commander. The benefit this brings to the Commander is from a holistic
approach to finding the right combination of forces to achieve desired effects. No
one does this at a Tier 3 level and [it] will certainly improve flexibility across
domains.”
However, some players suggested that the XDOCE construct might violate the C2 principle
of simplicity used in the Global game by creating additional processes, procedures,
personnel and authorities at the Tier 3 level.
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Recommendation 2.1: Continue to examine and refine the XDOCE Concept, to include
how the XDOCE will integrate with current organizational staffs and C2 functions.
Authorities And Processes
Delegating Command Authority to XDOCEs
Finding 2.2: XDOCEs may require command authority to execute cross-domain operations.
Discussion: Players emphasized that CJTU staffs must possess the requisite cross-domain
expertise to effectively employ all forces assigned to the CJTU Commander. They concluded
that maintaining this expertise on staff will increase the likelihood of delegating operational
control of forces to peer and subordinate commanders because they have a greater level of trust
and confidence that their forces will be employed properly. While control of such forces may
be retained by a functional component commander (FCC) or delegated to a subordinate
CJTU, the command authority can also be retained by the assigned commander or
delegated to an appropriate XDOCE member with the requisite domain knowledge and
expertise to effectively plan and direct forces. For example, if an Aegis cruiser is assigned to
a CJTU under the ACC, then a maritime domain expert, well-versed in the operational
employment of such a platform, must be available on the C JTU staff to either advise the
CJTU Commander or to assume control if delegated.
In Global ’14, the XDOCE authorities were limited to coordination with XDOCE’s at either
the JTF (Tier 2) or FCC (Tier 3) levels, as no XDOCE’s existed at the CTU/CJTU (Tier 4)
level. As expected, this coordination often consisted of arranging cross-domain support, either
as the requester or provider of a desired effect. However, much of the XDOCE coordination
consisted of communicating logistical requirements between the SCC and the other Tier 3
FCC’s, which is not envisioned as a responsibility of the XDOCE.
During Global ’14, the control of all such forces was delegated by the FCC to their
subordinate CJTU’s, which were then responsible for the employment of those assets.
Unfortunately, since the CJTU’s were 1 or 2-person cells with no XDOCE, they generally
lacked the relevant domain expertise and requisite staff capacity to effectively employ assets
from other domains. While the CONOPS currently addresses the need for domain-specific
expertise as part of both an XDOCE and CJTU staff, it does not address the potential for an
XDOCE member being delegated command authority by either an FCC or CJTU
commander.
Recommendation 2.2: Revise the XDOCE portion of the CONOPS to incorporate the
potential for an XDOCE member to be delegated command authority by their assigned
commander.
XDOCE Process and Integration with Current C2 Processes
Finding 2.3: The relationship between XDOCE processes and current processes used to
plan, direct, monitor, and assess operations at the Tier 2, 3, and 4 level is not well defined
and understood.
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Discussion: Lack of specific XDOCE processes in the CONOPS makes it difficult to
ascertain how the XDOCE will integrate with existing operational planning and execution
processes. While no XDOCE processes are specified in the CONOPS, Global ’14 created some
notional products and processes in an attempt to begin to identify the relevant processes
that the XDOCE may be involved in. Accordingly, the XDOCE participants in the game were
responsible for producing the Component Commander Need Requests and Fill Orders. The
Need Requests were intended to capture the component’s capability or effects shortfalls or
gaps, such as the need for logistics, transportation, or a desired effect (e.g., neutralize mine
storage facility) due to a lack of organic capacity or capability. The Fill Orders provided the
means for a component commander to satisfy another FCC’s Need Request. The JTF
XDOCE representative monitored the need-fill process and intervened as necessary to ensure
that critical needs were either filled by component commanders or forwarded outside the
task force for resourcing. While these products and processes were effective in giving the
XDOCE players a viable role in the game, they tended to stovepipe the XDOCE participants
from the other cell players, since these products could only be created and edited by the
XDOCE, while the Integrated Task Order (ITO) that it supported could only be developed
and modified by the non-XDOCE participants in the FCC cells.
Several players suggested institutionalizing the XDOCE as a board, cell or working group, with a
clearly defined battle rhythm and responsibilities. For example, within the ACC and associated
JFACC AOC, should the XDOCE participate in the apportionment and allocation processes? At
the MCC and associated JFMCC MOC, how will the XDOCE support concurrent efforts within
plans, future ops and current ops? As one player noted: “… [we] must find a way to integrate the
XDOCE planning into the notional planning cycle in order to truly be effective.”
Recommendation 2.3: The CONOPS should identify specific operational planning and
execution-related processes that the XDOCE will participate in, what that participation will
consist of, and how these processes interrelate with current PDMA processes at the tier 2, 3,
and 4 levels. While many different approaches could be taken to incorporating the XDOCE
in to the Boards, Bureaus, Centers, Cells and Working Groups (B2C2WG) process, pick one
- such as a dedicated XDOCE cell - define the associated relationships and modify as
necessary, based on feedback from games and exercises.
Roles And Responsibilities
XDOCE vs. LNOs
Finding 2.4: The difference between XDOCE planners and LNOs is not well defined and
understood.
Discussion: Many players suggested that an XDOCE was simply a collection of super
LNO’s. Such comments, however, miss the point that the XDOCE is first and foremost a
domain expert who can advise the commander, rather than a service rep that is present in
many cases simply to protect their parent command’s equities and serve as an additional
conduit for information. The following player observation indicates a much more nuanced
understanding of the role of the XDOCE and how it differs from simply an LNO:
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“The tendency to employ XDOCEs as a coordinating element to move
‘capabilities’ across domains does not add value to how the Joint process works
already. In other words, the XDOCE is not a LNO. The LNO works well under the
Tier 4 level where you are looking at task-based actions to achieve effects. The
XDOCE should be applied at the Tier 2 and 3 levels to look at cross-domain
coordination to realize mission effects to achieve conditions.”
The following observation also highlights the role of the XDOCE, as well as whom they
should work for and their authority:
“[The] XDOCE is meant to be integrated planners/operators who can coordinate
integrated multiple domain solutions. They don’t belong to another functional
(service) commander, but to the domain component command where they are
assigned. They should be empowered equally with members of the assigned CC.”
Recommendation 2.4: The CONOPS should be revised to specify how the roles and
responsibilities of the XDOCE and an LNO are different in order to reduce confusion and aid in
acceptance of the XDOCE construct. This explanation should highlight the fact that an XDOCE
rep brings domain expertise to the staff, along with an allegiance to the assigned commander and
the ability to exercise delegated authority that a service or function-based LNO does not.
The Role of Sustainment and XDOCE Planning and Execution
Finding 2.5: The CJFSCC XDOCE is fundamentally different from the other component
commander XDOCE’s because it supports a commander responsible for an operational
function – sustainment – rather than a functional domain.
Discussion: The CJFSCC XDOCE’s roles and responsibilities may be different from those of the
other component commanders, since the CJFSCC is not responsible either for a domain or for
achieving kinetic or non-kinetic effects. While the XDOCE played a similar domain
coordination role in the domain-based functional component cells (CJFACC, CJFICC, CJFLCC
and CJFMCC), the CJFSCC XDOCE was used more as a sustainment coordination cell to
coordinate logistics and lift requirements with the other component commanders. That is not
the intent of the XDOCE and the CJFSCC should maintain sustainment expertise as part of the
staff that can interface with each of the other functional component commanders to consolidate
sustainment requirements and to develop and execute a sustainment plan as part of their general
staff responsibilities.
However, a CJFSCC XDOCE, fully manned with domain warfare specialists, could leverage
domain assessments from the other functional component commanders to advise the CJFSCC on
operational access and protection issues. For example, a Maritime XDOCE rep on the CJFSCC
staff would help the CJFSCC understand the operational access and protection requirements
associated with operating sustainment assets in the maritime domain. This would assist the
CJFSCC in either articulating their protection requirements to the other component commanders
or executing these missions themselves, should the CJFSCC be entrusted with that responsibility
for assigned forces.
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Recommendation 2.5: The CONOPS should be modified to include a discussion of the
uniqueness of the CJFSCC XDOCE, including how the roles and responsibilities of the CJFSCC
XDOCE related to operational access and protection support CJFSCC mission accomplishment.
Organizational Composition
Cross-Domain Expertise and CJTU Staffs
Finding 2.6: CJTU staffs must possess the requisite cross-domain expertise to effectively
employ all forces assigned to the CJTU Commander.
Discussion: The CONOPS states that “The XDOCE is purpose-built to address the assigned
mission & areas of expertise not already present within the staff. The number of experts per
domain or warfighting function will depend on the scale and scope of the operation.” In
Global ’15, there was one “Lead” XDOCE rep assigned to the JTF staff (Tier 2), with each FCC
(Tier 3) having reps from each of the “other” domains. For example, the Combined Joint Forces
Land Component Commander (or CJFLCC) XDOCE had air, maritime, cyber and space domain
reps, but no land domain rep, since land domain expertise was resident in the core CJFLCC staff.
The CJTSCC XDOCE, while not responsible for a particular domain, had air, maritime, land and
cyber, but no space rep, since it was envisioned that the SCC would not require such expertise to
accomplish its mission.
While the game only had XDOCE’s at the Tier 2 and 3 levels, the players often commented on
the appropriateness of the XDOCE for the Tier 4 or TU/CJTU level. Some believed that a CJTU
could benefit from the cross-domain expertise that an XDOCE would provide, while others felt
that a CJTU staff would have such expertise by its very nature as a joint task unit staff.
Regardless of whether such expertise is organic to the staff or provided by an XDOCE, there did
seem to be a need for XDOCE-like capabilities at the CJTU in order to understand and be able to
employ cross-domain solutions effectively. When establishing a CJTU, the CJTU Commander
must ensure that his staff possesses the necessary cross-domain expertise - either organic or
augmented by a purpose-built XDOCE - to effectively employ all capabilities assigned. This was
illustrated by the following player comment:
“Need a Tier 4 XDOCE manned with experts in weapon systems attached to
their CJTU. Can’t have Tier 4 taking actions on attached weapon systems for
which they have no experience, and especially, [no] understanding of the RISK
they are incurring.”
Recommendation 2.6: The CONOPS should emphasize the need for a CJTU staff to possess the
requisite cross-domain expertise, either organic or augmented by a purpose-built XDOCE, to
effectively employ all assigned forces.
COMBINED JOINT TASK UNIT (CJTU)
Strengths And Weaknesses
“With the understanding of, education for, and training using mission command
as the philosophic method to warfight this may work if the commander and staff at
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the CJTU are comfortable operating with limited information from his/her higher
headquarters.”
– Global 14’ Player
Current Service Task Forces and CJTUs
Finding 3.1: The relationship between CJTUs and existing service task force organizations are
not well defined and understood.
Discussion: The CONOPS does not adequately discuss the differences and similarities between
existing service task force structures and the CJTU concept, and how they interrelate during both
peacetime and conflict. The CJTU construct was suggested by some players as “another layer of
bureaucracy” that may duplicate existing structures at the task force level. Carrier Strike Groups
(CSGs), Air Force Air Expeditionary Wings (AEWs), Marine Air-Ground Task Force
(MAGTFs), and Army Battalion Task Force were highlighted as examples of service specific
organizations that currently integrate capabilities across different domains to achieve a specific
mission. However, players concluded that combining specific capabilities from across these
structures would enhance cross-domain synergy and operational integration by providing tactical
commanders more options to rapidly gain domain superiority and achieve operational access
early in a conflict, and quickly respond to changing situations or establish an advantage in some
combination of domains. Accordingly, the CONOPS suggests that the CJTU concept is similar to
any other tactical force under a functional component, except that it has the potential to integrate
capabilities in all domains-including space and cyberspace- across services and nations. If
current TUs and CJTUs are expected to operate together under the same command, “then
planners and operators need to acquire a better understanding of the roles and responsibilities
between them” and how forces from TUs are assigned to CJTUs. Some players suggested that
removing forces from current TUs and placing them under the command of a CJTU during a
conflict could help or hinder future options and capabilities available to tactical commanders.
Specifically, some players posited that establishing CJTUs might reduce cohesion of current
service organizations (MAGTF, CSG, etc.), while others suggested that the benefit would be
lasting and far-reaching for both the staff and tactical forces. Understanding this relationship
warrants further examination and consideration for inclusion into the CONOPS.
Recommendation 3.1: The CONOPS should identify the similarities and differences between
existing service task unit structures and the CJTU concept; the roles and responsibilities between
existing service task force units and CJTUs prior to and during a conflict; and the benefits and
unintended consequences of integrating capabilities from standing TUs into CJTUs.
Organizational Composition
CJTU Mission and Deconfliction Requirements
Finding 3.2: CJTUs should be tailored and scaled based on mission, line of operation, and/or a
geographical area of responsibility in order to integrate forces and effects from multiple domains
in an A2/AD environment.
Discussion: The CJTU, as it is currently written, brings together forces from two or more
services and two or more domains for a specific mission, line of effort or geographic area.
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Players largely agreed that the creation and design of a CJTU should be based on a specific
mission or task to be completed. One player noted the following:
“This idea works great at Tier 4 as long as it was created for a specific mission in
space or time. In other words, their mission is to take island X, or their mission is
to attrite land forces in a certain area from Time 0 to time X. Otherwise, there is
potential to just morph into a regular Task Unit.”
Players compared the CJTU to the German concept of building on the fly Kamfgruppe for
specific missions and for a finite time. As one player noted, “It took them a generation to
inculcate this concept into their forces. If we are serious about this, we need to be prepared to
devote the time, money and resources to train and grow the folks that can command CJTUs
effectively.” Similarly, another player suggested that “the danger of loose mission command and
higher level intent is that all CJTUs could end up attacking the same target or ignoring a threat.
Coordination is still needed. When missions are assigned to the CJTU they need specific
boundaries in order to give them the freedom to act.” Accordingly, the CJTU would need to be
mission oriented, operating within clearly delineated geographical boundaries. Finally, some
players suggested that CJTUs may operate most effectively when organized into smaller units
over a short time period.
Recommendation 2.2: The CONOPS should include relevant examples or ‘use-cases’ for CJTU
employment, such as Integrated Air and Missile Defense (IAMD), to help readers understand the
CJTU construct, while also highlighting the need to specifically delineate area of responsibilities
for assigned CJTUs to reduce coordination requirements and provide for improved freedom of
action. Additionally, such mission-tailored CJTU’s should be integrated into joint exercises and
war games to further their development and acceptance.
Standing and Ad Hoc CJTUs and Training Implications
Finding 3.3: Both standing and ad hoc CJTUs may be required to deal with dynamic operational
environments.
Discussion: Whether standing or ad hoc, players posited that the integration of capabilities
across domains and services provides component commanders greater options to manage
complex operations in an A2/AD environment. Both standing and ad hoc CJTUs were posited to
enhance a commander’s ability to establish superiority in some combination of domains in order
to enable freedom of action required by the mission. The CONOPS suggests that CJTUs should
be formed during crisis planning, “where the CJTU is formed with no prior integration or
training,” and prior to a conflict “with time to create synergy, team unity, and common TTPs
among the CJTU forces.” Players emphasized that both standing and ad hoc CJTUs should be
guided by common organizational principles, plans, procedures, and protocols. Several players
posited that risk to mission and forces would increase if CJTUs were not afforded adequate predeployment or pre-operation joint training. As one player noted, “By specifying a finite number
of possible CJTU’s, not only can a fixed number be certified, but training for the personnel in the
CJTU’s can be standardized and roles, responsibilities, and TTPs can be formalized and
implemented throughout the force.” Players suggested that both approaches have significant
costs in terms of time, money, and resources required to fundamentally change the way the
services organize, train, and equip its forces.
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Some players posited that CJTUs may be “too dynamic to be certified, and any attempt to certify
it would limit a commander’s flexibility in forming a CJTU when urgently needed for a specific
mission.” If certification is required for a CJTU, “the UK method to certify staff and
commanders to meet a number of missions” is worth considering. However, certifying the staffs
still leaves individual units uncertified to work together in the CJTU construct. One player who
supported CJTU certification stated, “I like the idea that CJTUs are purpose-built and require
certification. This will mean that we only have a handful of CJTU “types” that are well
understood and we can train to them.”
Recommendation 3.3: The CONOPS should specify that while standing or pre-identified
CJTUs would be the preferred approach (due to training and certification issues), ad hoc CJTUs
may also serve a valuable function. The CONOPS should also clearly explain who is responsible
for identifying the conditions or criteria for creating a CJTU during peacetime and in crises;
discuss who retains the responsibility and authority to establish a standing or ad hoc CJTU; and
identify the process for establishing and disestablishing a CJTU whether it is standing or ad hoc.
In addition, CJTU training and certification requirements should be identified, with existing fleet
and coalition certification procedures considered as a starting point.
XDOCE and CJTU Operations
Finding 3.4: Maintaining cross-domain expertise on the CJTU staff is a critical enabler for
integrating kinetic and non-kinetic effects and capabilities from multiple domains into CJTU
operations.
Discussion: Players concluded that CJTU staffs require a high degree of joint experience and
expertise at a relatively junior level. They noted that current joint and service doctrine, training,
and education is not sufficient to employ CJTUs. The CJTU concept will require a fundamental
change to joint education and career progression and force the services to relinquish core service
or domain competencies to support other functional component commanders on a permanent
basis. While many theater and national assets may never be assigned to a CJTU commander,
CJTU planners must maintain the resident expertise on their staffs to understand how these
capabilities effect operations across the information domain and the traditional warfare domains.
As one player noted: “We must train to integrate these systems into the theater of operations -the CJTU must operate in all 5 domains simultaneously, for no other reason than our adversary
does.”
Players suggested that “in order for the full brunt of the cross-domain and joint assets to be
effectively used, the ‘ninja warriors’ that were proposed for the XDOCE concept” would also be
required for the CJTU. In fact, some believed that there would be no need for an XDOCE if the
CJTU were comprised of experienced warfighters from across the services. This notion
compliments the CONOPS, which suggests that as joint planners become more adept at crossdomain integration, the need for an XDOCE and the added manpower requirement will no longer
be required. One player noted, “beef-up the CJTU and CJTF staffs with smart cross-domain
planners and there is no need for an XDOCE.” Similarly, another player suggested, “for CJTUs
to be effective, they would need a full staff of joint SMEs capable of using the right kit
regardless of domain to achieve an effect.”
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While the CONOPS generally describes the composition and responsibilities of the XDOCEs
assigned to a CJTU staff, it does not explain the interaction between XDOCE planners and
traditional planning teams assigned to existing task units. In addition to maintaining crossdomain expertise to plan and execute fires operations, a CJTU staff should be comprised of
sustainment, intelligence, and communications experts skilled in supporting cross-domain
operations at both the operational and tactical level. Maintaining this level of expertise at the Tier
4 level is critical when planning and executing cross-domain operations in a time constrained and
communications degraded environment.
The CONOPS suggests that the composition of the CJTU staff should reflect the cross-service
and combined composition of the forces assigned to the CJTU to ensure those employing the
forces have a thorough knowledge of their capabilities and limitations. However, given that
CJTUs may be created on the fly and re-organized to meet emerging mission requirements,
CJTU staffs must possess a comprehensive knowledge of capabilities, limitations, and effects in
all domains to tactically exploit the adversary, even when communication with senior and peer
commanders is unavailable. This suggests that Tier 4 XDOCEs should possess similar
knowledge, skills, and abilities as Tier 3 XDOCEs, but further consideration should be given to
exploring additional qualities and attributes of a CJTU staff officer beyond just filling the job of
a typical staff officer or LNO type billet.
Recommendation 3.4: The CONOPS should explain the interaction between XDOCE planners
and traditional planning teams assigned to existing CJTU staffs; discuss the roles and
responsibilities, and required knowledge and skillset of sustainment, intelligence, and
communications planners assigned to CJTU staffs; and discuss the requisite knowledge and
skillset required to integrate new capabilities and forces into an existing CJTU.
Authorities
Achieving Mission Success through Increased Command Authority
Finding 3.5: Having the ability to change mission, time, and force at the tactical level enabled
commanders to rapidly respond and adapt to a wide range of missions across the JOA.
Discussion: ‘TACON-plus’ was a notional authority created for the game that allowed
commanders to change mission, time, and place of forces. Over the course of game play,
functional component commanders increasingly delegated ‘TACON-plus’ to their Tier 4
commanders. Many players suggested that they would need authorities similar to ‘TACON-plus’
to effectively command capabilities in all five domains. However, some viewed it as a “crutch”
that gave CJTU commanders “too much authority, therefore causing too much ‘out of sync’ with
[the] component command[s] when executing the next set of orders.” Furthermore, some players
acknowledged that “rather than following a set of orders to attack different targets, CJTU
Commanders might begin attacking the same targets all at once and leaving other enemy units
unengaged.” While the CONOPS encourages the need to delegate greater authority to CJTU
commanders, it does not discuss potential risks or consequences for doing so. The following
player comment highlights this concern:
Throwing a bunch of CJTUs in a geographic area, all capable of operating in
multiple domains, then giving ‘TACON -plus’ to the respective CJTUs, then
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degrading comms to all is a recipe for disaster in terms of unity of effort (there
will be none) risk to friendly forces (there will be lots) and ultimately failure to
accomplish mission objectives.
In general, however, the players concluded that increased levels of command authority at the
tactical level decreases decision-making time by eliminating the need to coordinate with
superiors to acquire permissions and capabilities. Having the expertise, authorities, and
capabilities organic to a CJTU Commander enables mission command and allows commanders
to quickly adjust and respond to changing conditions in the battle space. Players emphasized that
tactical commanders will increasingly rely on such ‘OPCON-minus’ authority as both the
operating environment and communications with higher authority deteriorates.
Recommendation 3.5: Revise the CONOPS to state that CJTU commanders should be
delegated most of the authorities associated with OPCON (except for the authority to relieve
commanders’ of attached forces) via establishing directives in order to enable them to effectively
exercise mission command, particularly in response to the challenges posed to C2 in a
communications degraded or denied environment.
Processes
CJTU Operations and Battlespace Management
Finding 3.7: CJTUs require increased coordination and situational awareness to prevent
fratricide, overlaps, and seams.
Discussion: Players suggested that integrating joint capabilities and managing the deconfliction
process for concurrent fires missions remains a significant challenge today. The nature of crossdomain operations in a congested A2/AD environment increases the deconfliction problem for
CJTU Commanders performing simultaneous missions with forces operating in the air, maritime,
land, space and cyberspace domains. While players found the notional game processes and
products beneficial to gain situational awareness and deconflict forces, they recognized that
current processes, procedures, and products at the Tier 4 level do not account for this level of
coordination within and across domains.
During the game, the Domain Coordination Order (DCO) was published for each domain by the
lead component commander for that domain (CJFMCC for the maritime domain, CJFACC for
the air domain, CJFLCC for the land domain, and the CJFICC for both the space and cyberspace
domains). The DCOs served a purpose similar to current airspace control orders, water space
management plans, and fire support coordination orders. Units operating under the authority of
different Tier 3 commanders in the same area who did not appear on a common DCO (i.e. all
aircraft on the ACO, all ships on the MCO, etc.) risked committing fratricide during the Combat
Operations phase. While the gaming environment provided Tier 4 players with perfect
communication and situational awareness of the JOA, the players acknowledged “a product like
the DCO would be necessary to gain situational awareness and coordinate forces and effects
within and across sections of the JOA.”
Moreover, players at the Tier 3 and Tier 4 levels discussed the need to maintain a shared
Integrated Task Order (ITO) and common operating picture that describes and depicts which
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commands and forces are allocated to specific tasks, missions, and domains across the theater. A
notional product similar to this was prepared by each Tier 3 commander and sent to Tier 4 task
unit commanders to support the employment of their assigned forces. It brought all aspects of
C2, targeting, maneuver, kinetic and non-kinetic fires, and logistics together in a single order to
enable operations at the task unit level.
Although many players perceived the DCO and ITO as essential products to reduce fratricide and
synergize planning efforts, several players questioned whether it would replace or complement
existing real-world products that are in-place today. In order to reduce the likelihood of fratricide
and prevent overlaps and gaps, tactical commanders may be required to adopt new processes and
procedures to coordinate and deconflict forces and desired effects within and across domains.
The CONOPS suggests that XDOCEs are responsible for developing plans that include battlespace control measures, domain management, restricted operations zones, and fire support
coordination measures; however, the CONOPS does not identify the types of processes and
products that a CJTU is required to develop or contribute to during current and future planning.
Recommendation 2.7: The CONOPS should identify relevant processes and products at the Tier
4 level that are required to deconflict forces and effects within and across domains, including
how existing process and products can be modified to serve this purpose, while also enabling
CJTU’s to manage their local battlespace when required.
COMBINED JOINT FORCE SUSTAINMENT COMPONENT COMMANDER
Strengths And Weakness
“The game only allowed the CJFSCC to play 1 1/2 of the 6 or so objectives for
the CJFSCC…the CJFSCC construct should be considered for a future game to
test its ability to provide Operational Contracting Support, Host Nation Support,
Interagency Logistics, Allied/Partner Logistics, etc.”
– Global ’14 Player
Enhancing Unity of Effort and Operational Integration at the Cost of Simplicity
Finding 4.1: The CJFSCC could enhance the ability to synchronize sustainment requirements
across component commanders and integrate joint, interagency, and multinational
sustainment forces at the operational level; however, tactical execution decisions risk being
misaligned with the CJFSCC’s sustainment plan in a communications denied or degraded
environment.
Discussion: Several players suggested that the CJFSCC may enhance unity of effort and
operational integration by serving as the single point of contact for engaging TRANSCOM,
DLA, and multinational partners. Similarly, standardizing procedures, systems, and point of
contacts-to include the operational plans and requirements of component commanders- may
minimize inefficiencies in joint operations. As one player noted, the CJFSCC may
“streamline multiple flows of supply into a single supply chain …and minimize the logistics
footprint, forces, people, commodities, and resources required to accomplish its mission.”
When sustainment forces and supply are at its highest demand, some suggested that the
CJFSCC synchronizes sustainment requirements and priority of effort at the operational level.
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The CJFSCC was thought to have provided component commanders greater flexibility to
shift priorities, which would allow them to focus on combat employment. The following
player comment highlights the benefit of the SCC from the perspective of the CJTF:
“There was Centralized command and sustainment from the viewpoint of the
CJTF. We felt like the CJFSCC could provide sustainability of the ENTIRE plan
in real time. Synchronizing in near real time and tracking via XDOCE and the
plan being put in place; whether or not you felt you were giving us your most up
to date info.”
Similarly, some Tier 3 players suggested that they were more comfortable assuming greater
risk in combat missions when communication and coordination between the CJFSCC was
greatest. The following comment is representative of players who viewed the CJFSCC as a
valuable contribution to game play:
Much like a super J4, it [CJFSCC] allowed us to accomplish what we needed. If
the A2/AD environment degrades, our ability to [control is reduced, and we must]
let lower echelons use their initiative to achieve the mission; it’s going to be
important to trust subordinates and push authority down.
However, command authority of all operational sustainment forces may require greater
coordination and situational awareness between the CJFSCC and component commanders to
mitigate redundancies and ensure mission success. The ‘pushing’ and ‘pulling’ of
sustainment requirements and capabilities emerged as a major source of contention between
the CJFSCC and Tier 3 Commanders. For the most part, the CJFSCC only pushed
sustainment capabilities when requested by component commanders. Working through the
CJFSCC XDOCEs, component commanders relied on the CJFSCC to push capabilities
based on their overall plan. This tension often pulled players away from planning combat
missions and increased the need to coordinate and communicate with peer and subordinate
commands. In a contested A2/AD environment, players suggested that the CJFSCC must
have the capability to anticipate future requirements and push logistics forward. The
following player comments highlight this disconnect.
“CJFACC asked for airlift to move jammers to proper locations and should have
been allowed to send NEED and get prioritized IAW entire theater need--not
rejected without submission. CJFSCC is a good idea to prevent dupe work but it’s
going to require a lot of coordination to ensure all missions are met.”
“The CJFSCC needs to push material base on situational awareness of plans/ops
(vs pull) to all of us at the Tier 3 level. All Component Commanders need high
level, if not same level, of joint situational awareness to better integrate and
synchronize sustainment requirements and resources.”
“We need Logistics to be pushed, and following our schemes of maneuver.”
Recommendation 4.1: The CONOPS should address the relationship between component
commanders and the CJFSCC as it relates to anticipating future requirements and
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proactively providing sustainment capabilities, especially in a communications denied and
degraded environment.
Roles And Responsibilities
SCC or JTF J4
Finding 4.2: It is unclear whether centralized sustainment is needed, and if so, whether the
CJFSCC or JTF J4 should assume such responsibilities.
Discussion: Players were divided on whether the sustainment function needed to be
centralized under a single entity, and if so, whether it should be carried out by a new
component commander or handled by the JTF J4. Those in favor of the J4 suggested that
adding a new component commander for sustainment would create span of control issues,
particularly in a communications degraded or denied environment. Current and future
resource concerns were cited as major barriers to creating a separate command structure
when perhaps the responsibilities could be carried out by sustainment liaisons embedded
into today’s C2 structure. Conversely, some suggested that reducing overlaps and
synchronizing efforts across the force would end up saving the department of defense over the
long-term.
Others indicated that if the CJFSCC responsibilities were to include force protection
responsibilities for the sustainment forces, including APODs and SPODs, then perhaps a
separate entity would be required. The UK logistics model that is responsible for managing
strategic lift to theatre for extensive land campaigns was cited as one possible model upon
which to base the CJFSCC, based on its success at sustaining combat forces in theater.
Recommendation 4.2: Additional analysis should be undertaken to determine whether a
centralized approach to sustainment is needed. If centralization is chosen as the preferred
approach, then additional analysis should be undertaken to determine if the CJFSCC is
better served to perform such a mission, rather than by the J4 on a JTF or Combatant
Commander staff.
Management of the TPFDD (Time-Phased Force & Deployment Data)
Finding 4.3: There is confusion over the appropriate role of the CJFSCC regarding the
TPFDD, as well as the transfer of command authority between TRANSCOM, CJTF, and
the CJFSCC.
Discussion: Players were divided on whether the TPFDD should be managed by the
CJFSCC or the JTF Commander. A shared responsibility where by the JTF manages
combat forces and the CJFSCC manages sustainment forces into theater could result in
gaps, seams, and overlaps that would disconnect these forces, especially in a
communications denied or degraded environment. One player noted, “I fully agree that
the CJFSCC should manage the TPFDD...during game play, some of us actually thought
they were. In reality, the CJFSCC would manage the flow of sustainment forces into theater
to TRANSCOM via the JTF Commander.” If the JTF were to manage inter-theater
sustainment and combat forces, then the J4 would assume a broader role in working with the
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CJFSCC to ensure that forces arrive at the time and place designated by the CJFSCC. The
following player comments highlight this discrepancy:
“CJFSCC’s don’t write the TPFDD - but they can enable it, and generate the
Theatre sustainment/basing requirements in order to give the warfighter what he
actually wants/needs - which is not a bit of kit - but a capability.”
“The CJTF should plan TPFDD (with input from CJFMCC, CJFACC, CJFLCC
and CJFICC) and the CJFSCC should execute accomplishing the who, what,
where and when in getting it there.”
Moreover, players had a limited understanding of the transfer of command authority of
sustainment forces between TRANSCOM, the CJTF, and the CJFSCC. More broadly,
players frequently highlighted the need to better understand the relationship between
TRANSCOM, CJTF, and CJFSCC, as well as their associated inputs and outputs over
phases of a campaign. A common operating picture and persistent coordination and planning
between TRANSCOM, CJTF, and the CJFSCC is increasingly important to support interand intra-theater sustainment in an A2/AD environment.
Recommendation 4.3: The CONOPS should specify that the CJTF is responsible for
managing the TPFDD, but that the CJFSCC supports the CJTF by ensuring that the plan is
logistically sustainable. Additionally, the CONOPS should specifically identify the
relationship between TRANSCOM, the CJTF, and the CJFSCC to reduce confusion
regarding roles and responsibilities.
Operational Protection of Fixed and Mobile Forces and Infrastructure
Finding 4.4: The responsibility for protecting sustainment forces and associated land-based
infrastructure warrants further examination.
Discussion: The risk posed to sustainment forces both at sea and ashore was frequently
highlighted during game play. Some players suggested that the CJFSCC should maintain its
own combat forces to protect sustainment assets, while others posited that assigning combat
forces to the CJFSCC would take away from accomplishing more important combat
missions. The CONOPS states that even though the CJFSCC does not provide operational
protection of sustainment assets, it must identify and prioritize Force Protection
requirements related to bases, supplies, and lines of communication (LOCs). Several players
suggested that CJTUs should be assigned to the CJFSCC to protect both mobile and fixed
sustainment forces; this may remove a layer of coordination and complexity and potentially
increase the likelihood that sustainment forces will be adequately defended/protected. This
assertion runs contrary to the CONOPS, which requires CJTUs assigned to the CJFSCC to
rely on support from other functional component commanders for their defense/protection.
Recommendation 4.4: Further analysis should be undertaken to determine whether the
CJFSCC should be responsible for operational protection for any or all of its assigned forces
in the air, land and maritime domains, along with associated infrastructure, with the results
incorporated into the CONOPS.

38

Findings and Recommendations
Authorities
Benefits of Increased Authorities
Finding 4.5: Having the authority to change mission, time, and place of sustainment forces
enabled CJFSCC-assigned CJTU Commanders to meet mission requirements.
Discussion: Players acknowledged the benefits of pushing greater authorities down to CJTU
and TU Commanders. Having the authority to change mission, time, and place of
sustainment forces enabled CJFSCC-assigned CJTU Commanders to rapidly adapt to
emerging mission requirements. Even though Tier 4 players had perfect situational
awareness and communications, they acknowledged that they had limited knowledge of
sustainment operations and CJFSCC plans. One player noted the following:
“For most of the operations we were doing with the CJFSCC, what we were very
focused on was what level of TACON or ‘TACON-plus’ we had. If it was TACON,
we didn’t feel comfortable going beyond mission; with ‘TACON-plus’ we went
beyond that point.”
However, the authority to change mission, time, and place of sustainment forces
occasionally misaligned CJFSCC plans with their CJTUs actions. This misalignment
increased when communications between them were limited or denied. Moreover, the
relationship between Directive Authority for Logistics (DAFL) and the delegation of
OPCON, TACON, and ‘TACON-plus’ to tactical commanders was not well understood.
Recommendation 4.5: CJTU authorities should include the ability to change the assigned
mission, time and place for assigned or attached forces, based on an understanding of
commander’s intent and the CJFSCC plan. Additionally, the CONOPS should be modified
to explain the implications for the DAFL, based on the increased command authorities
assigned to the CJFSCC and its subordinates.
Interagency and Multinational Operational Integration
Finding 4.6: Partners and allies remain essential to execute cross-domain operations in a
complex A2/AD environment and understanding how they integrate into the CJFSCC
requires further examination.
Discussion: The CONOPS suggests that the CJFSCC “must be capable of sustaining joint
combat forces and interagency and multinational partners, from strategic-level national
providers to forward units at the tactical level, while minimizing the logistics footprint in the
area of operations”. In an era of Combined Joint Task Units, players suggested that
sustainment planners and operators at each level of the C2 structure must improve their
understanding of the critical capabilities and barriers that help or hinder operational
integration of interagency and multinational sustainment forces. The importance of
establishing and maintaining basing and overflight access with regional partners and allies
was frequently highlighted as a critical element to intra-theater sustainment of joint forces in
an A2/AD environment.
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As the single point of contact with international partners, several players suggested that the
CJFSCC should be a standing organization that enables planners and operators to develop
trust and confidence with multinational forces through persistent cooperation in the areas of
information sharing, planning, and training. Under this premise, the CJFSCC would need to
establish a formalized process that allows planners and operators to work together on a more
formal and consistent basis in peacetime. This will provide U.S. and international planners
and operators the opportunity to develop a shared awareness and understanding of how to
work with each other when planning and conducting sustainment operations in future
A2/AD environments. Similar to current functional component commanders in peacetime,
the CJFSCC would be a standing organization responsible for planning sustainment
operations for each combatant commander’s area of responsibility, planning and executing
joint and combined sustainment training exercises, and exercising command and control of
sustainment operations in peacetime and wartime.
The CONOPS states, that “The Combined Joint Force Sustainment Commander must
minimize contracting officers and sustainment contractors.” In order to do so, players
suggested creating a separate office within the CJFSCC responsible for managing
Operational Contract Support (OCS) with interagency and multinational partners. As the
single Operational level sustainment interface for our Allies and Partners, this office would
be responsible for working with the GCC J4 and JTF J4 to ensure that Host Nation Support
arrangements and Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreements (ACSA) are in alignment
with operational sustainment plans. The CJFSCC would work with interagency and
multinational partners to identify, integrate, and synchronize the types of support-including
food, fuel, transportation, and ammunition- to execute the campaign plan.
Recommendation 4.6: The CONOPS should highlight the importance and role of allies and
partners in executing the CJFSCC mission and identify critical capabilities and potential
barriers to integrating multinational sustainment forces.
Communications and Intelligence Support to the CJFSCC
Finding 4.7: Reliable communications and intelligence is critical to executing the CJFSCC
mission, particularly in an A2/AD environment.
Discussion: Players frequently highlighted the importance of protecting logistics data and
communications from adversary exploitation and manipulation. Players highlighted that the
CJFSCC must create contingency plans as the A2/AD environment changes and adjust “as
necessary for continued connectivity and timeliness of sustainment.” The CJFSCC portion
of the CONOPS does not reflect the need to develop “back-up plans” or characterize the
type of guidance that would help planners and operators understand how to coordinate and
communicate with the CJFSCC in order to sustain combat forces throughout the conflict.
Moreover, the CONOPS also suggests that the “XDOCE will provide the systems
connectivity and capacity for XDO C2.” Players frequently emphasized the importance of
defending logistics networks and ensuring that the SCC XDOCE maintains the resident
cyber and communications expertise to do so. Regardless of whether the CJFSCC or J-4
manages sustainment, players acknowledged the importance of operational and tactical
intelligence to support the movement and protection of fixed and mobile forces at sea and
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ashore. Similar to other component commanders, players advocated for integrating a J-2
staff and its associated processes into the existing CJFSCC organizational structure.
While the CONOPS vaguely describes intelligence and information support to the JTF and
CJTUs, it does not discuss its role in support of the CJFSCC. The CONOPS relies on the
XDOCE to comply with established Joint C2 data exchange standards to accelerate data
sharing across the operational and intelligence communities. The importance of intelligence
and communications to the CJFSCC while planning, directing, monitoring, and assessing
sustainment operations throughout each phase of the campaign plan is worthy of future
examination and inclusion into the CONOPS. Specifically, the following information should
be discussed in depth: how to coordinate and integrate information and intelligence to support
the sustainment commander; and specific guidance on what information or intelligence is
needed, where to get it from, and when to send or push it out between commanders.
Moreover, given the need to acquire and process information and intelligence, players were
uncertain of who would “own” the land, sea, air, cyber, and space ISR platforms tasked to
support the CJFSCC. Several players suggested that component commanders would support
the CJFSCC in this role, while others advocated for temporally “chopping” these forces to
the CJFSCC to conduct specific missions. Nevertheless, the CONOPS should describe how
ISR and communications is acquired and processed at the Tier 3 level and its relation to
CJTUs or TUs. One player comment suggested the following:
“There could be a scenario where the CJFSCC needs CJFICC capability added
to one of their CJTUs - EW and ISR are potential examples. Likewise, it is
reasonable to consider CJFSCC assets transferred to the CJFICC to achieve an
objective. A relay-equipped cargo aircraft, transferred to the CJFICC, providing
a Communications Bridge may be a good example.”
Recommendation 4.7: The CONOPS should highlight the role and responsibilities of
communications and intelligence personnel in support of the CJFSCC mission, incorporate a
J-2 and J-6 staff into the CJFSCC organization, and discuss who maintains control authority
over ISR assets supporting CJFSCC mission requirements.
ANALYTIC HIERARCHY PROCESS RESULTS
Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP) is a
decision support tool that uses a series of
pair-wise comparisons between criteria and
options to determine collective criteria
weighting and the resulting relative option
ranking based on the degree to which the
options meet the criteria.
Global ’14 participants were divided into
three cohorts based on their roles in the
game – Tier 2 (JTF), Tier 3 (Component

Figure : C2 Criteria Weighting
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Commands) and Tier 4 (CJTUs and TUs). The Tier 3 cohort was then sub-divided into the five
components (referred to here as the ACC, MCC, LCC, ICC and SCC).
During the final combined plenary session, participants were first asked to compare the relative
importance of the six criteria to effective command and control. Using the mean data for all
participants, the resultant criteria weighting is depicted above.
Using this weighting, the cohorts evaluated the degree to which each attribute (XDOCE, CJTU,
ICC and SCC) demonstrated or contributed to the criteria in terms of an overall C2 system. Put
another way, how desirable were each of the four attributes in terms of contributing to a C2
system’s overall unity of effort, flexibility, simplicity, resiliency, operational integration and
cross domain synergy?

Figure : C2 Attribute Evaluation by Tier
Tier 2 and Tier 3 responses were closely matched, with the ICC attribute scoring highest and the
SCC scoring lowest for both Tier 2 and 3. Conversely, Tier 4 scored the CJTU highest and the
XDOCE lowest.
Taking the Tier 3 results above and breaking them into their constituent component commander
parts produces the following results.
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Figure : C2 Attribute Evaluation by Component
ACC, MCC, ICC and SCC scored the ICC highest, while LCC scored the XDOCE highest.
ACC, MCC and LCC scored the SCC lowest; ICC scored the CJTU lowest; SCC scored the
XDOCE lowest.
For Tier 2, unity of effort and cross-domain synergy were the dominant factors contributing to
the high ICC score, as indicated by the graphs on the following page.8

Figure 7: Cross-Domain Synergy Assessment
by C2 Attribute and Tier

8

Figure 8: Unity of Effort Assessment
by C2 Attribute and Tier

Corner bar graphs show the relative criterion weighting and ranking for each tier.
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For Tier 4, flexibility, operational integration and cross-domain synergy were the most
significant criteria contributing to the CJTU high score, as indicated primarily by the following
graphs, as well as the cross-domain synergy graph above.

Figure 9: Flexibility Assessment by
C2 Attribute and Tier

Figure 10: Op Integration Assessment by
C2 Attribute and Tier
Simplicity and resiliency had the least amount of variation between the tiers and the attributes,
and therefore did little to discriminate between the attributes.
Consistent with Miles’ Law9, i.e. “Where you stand depends on where you sit,” Tiers 2 and 3
saw the greatest utility in the ICC and XDOCE attributes, as those attributes were embedded and
exercised at those levels. Similarly, Tier 4 saw the greatest value in the CJTU as it was exercised
at their level, while the XDOCE and other Tier 3 entities were largely “out of sight, out of
mind,” outside of receiving the periodic task orders and sending turn reports. This essentially
resulted in an ‘out of phase’ outcome; where Tier 2 and 3 scored an attribute high, Tier 4 scored
it low, and vice-versa.
AHP does not directly tell us anything more about the four attributes in terms of changes to the
draft CONOP. It does suggest that if further development and analysis is desired with regard to
C2 of cross-domain operations in A2/AD environments, then the priority for investigation should
be:
1. ICC
2. XDOCE
3. CJTU
4. SCC	
  

9

Rufus E. Miles, Jr. (1910-1996) was an assistant secretary under Presidents Eisenhower, Kennedy and Johnson.
He developed Miles’ Law and Six Other Maxims of Management; “Where you stand depends on where you sit,” i.e.
we see things and form judgments of things from our own perspective.
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SUMMARY OF PLAYER-DERIVED THEMES
“Joint XDO success is dependent upon level of expertise, authority, ability to
work together, and trust up, down, and across the commands; must have rich joint
operational expertise and experience to decide and act quicker than our
adversary…communicating information is a fundamental problem of C2, and one
that will only get worse in an A2/AD environment.”
– Global ’14 Player
Enabling Unity of Effort in Joint XDO
Achieving unity of effort was the central challenge to effective joint cross-domain operations in
an A2/AD environment. Three themes of expertise, authorities, and PDMA emerged as being
most important to players for enabling unity of effort in joint cross-domain operations. Players
concluded that no single service or nation has all the necessary capabilities to respond to the
wide range of required missions across the JOA. Unfortunately, integrating and synchronizing
capabilities across the joint force has been excessively complex and challenging. The challenge
in joint cross-domain operations is not due to a lack of resources or capabilities, but rather in
being able to quickly bring the right combination of capabilities together, regardless of service or
nation, at the right time and place to achieve an effect.
Expertise
XDO
Players emphasized that cross-domain operations would be necessary in future A2/AD
environments to achieve effects from domains where access is greater and risk is lower. While
each service has historically conducted cross-domain operations, players concluded that joint
cross-domain operations require a higher level of integration and expertise. Players at each level
of command recognized the lack of cross-domain expertise to plan and execute joint crossdomain operations. Specifically, they proposed that joint planners and operators need to develop
a broader knowledge base of joint capabilities operating in a single domain and the effects these
capabilities can provide to gain or maintain access in other domains. The integration of cyber,
space, and SOF at the operational and tactical level were three capability areas least understood
by players. As one player noted, “We need to integrate SOF into planning efforts, especially as
the CJFICC looks for ways to degrade Red C2 and prevent Red from degrading our C2.”
Similarly, another player noted the following:
“The greatest challenge with truly embracing the concept of the XDO is providing
the commander with the requisite expertise to command space, cyberspace, air,
maritime, and land units unilaterally and simultaneously. These domains are so
different and so specialized from one another that the SME’s in that area
currently provide direct support to a single commander.”
Players concluded that current doctrine, education, and training does not sufficiently provide
joint planners and operators with the knowledge and skills to effectively plan, direct, monitor,
and assess joint cross-domain operations in an A2/AD environment. As one player noted:
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“We haven’t done good integration because we’re playing the OLD way. We’re
NOT looking at RISK and using a different force than our own to perform a
mission with less risk. We’re trying to hit every nail with our OWN hammer. If I
had the visibility and understanding of different capabilities, I would have used a
different cross domain asset, but I didn’t.”
Players emphasized that the joint community needs to develop, agree to, and understand
definitions for each domain, as well as cross-domain operations. As one player noted, “How can
we do cross- domain thinking when services have not clearly defined where some domains begin
or end?” The participants suggested that cross-domain operations should become a core
competency and that joint training cycles for operational and tactical planning staffs should be
modified to include exercises involving cross-domain operations. Similarly, the joint
professional military education (JPME) curriculum should integrate cross-domain operations as a
complimentary approach for responding to the full spectrum of required missions, in both steady
state and crises response. Finally, the joint community should develop and publish an
overarching Cross-Domain Operations (XDO) Capstone Concept for Joint Operations (CCJO) to
complement the ASB Concept and Joint XDO C2 CONOPS and guide the development of future
joint force capabilities. The capabilities and competencies for executing joint cross-domain
operations in an A2/AD environment should be identified and trained to prior to conflict in order
to effectively execute theater campaign plans.
Joint XDO C2 CONOPS
In order to assess the efficacy of the four C2 attributes moving forward, players concluded that
the Joint XDO C2 CONOPS needs greater detail and the four attributes warrant further
examination. Specially, players emphasized the need to better understand the relative strengths
and weaknesses of the four attributes compared to the existing C2 system, as well as how their
integration would impact current organizational structures, roles and responsibilities, processes,
and authorities. For example, some questioned whether breaking up existing service
organizations (e.g., CSG, MAGTF, etc.) to form CJTUs would reduce unit cohesion and mission
effectiveness. Whether standing or ad hoc, players posited that all four C2 attributes would have
significant Title 10 (organize, train, and equip) implications and further analysis is warranted to
understand the short and long-term costs and benefits associated with implementation.
Nevertheless, players agreed that the services should further integrate platforms and personnel to
achieve future warfighting missions.
Players emphasized the need to identify and remove barriers to effectively employ joint
capabilities for cross-domain operations in an A2/AD environment. Leaders and
organizations at all levels must find better ways to combine their efforts, resources, and
capabilities to respond to future warfighting missions. As part of this effort, theater planners
should determine which missions warrant the use of cross-domain operations, to include
CJTUs. Many players suggested that junior personnel should have a greater role in exploring
new and innovative command and control ideas and concepts, while others suggested that this
demographic of leaders may lack sufficient experience and expertise to examine potential
problems with current structures and processes. Enhancing joint XDO C2 requires new ways
of thinking about and managing joint operations prior to and during a conflict. Leaders at all
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levels must be open to evolving and adapting the legacy C2 system of today to meet future
warfighting challenges.
Air-Sea Battle Concept
While not a new approach to warfare, players acknowledged that advanced adversary A2/AD
capabilities would challenge the ability of U.S. and allied forces to gain and maintain operational
access. Players concluded that theater campaign planning and design would benefit from using
cross-domain operations to disrupt, destroy, and defeat adversary forces as envisioned in the AirSea Battle Concept. However, many players reported they had not been exposed to the concept,
thus developing a better understanding of it would only enhance their ability to plan and execute
cross-domain operations in an A2/AD environment. Similar to the XDO Concept, operational
and tactical leaders should ensure planning staffs gain a deeper understanding of the ASB
Concept by first exploring threats posed by adversary A2/AD capabilities, how ASB might
address these threats, and how ASB and XDO impacts service and joint force development.
While service Title 10 war games continue to explore various aspects of the evolving A2/AD
environment, Combatant Commanders should leverage the results of these efforts in their own
war games and exercises to continue the examination of the ASB concept in realistic operational
scenarios. Such events provide an effective forum for strengthening relationships between
operational level and tactical level units, which is essential to effective implementation of the
ASB Concept. The results of these efforts should be shared with other Combatant Commands,
the Air-Sea Battle Office, the Joint Staff, and the Services, as well as Echelon 2 and 3
organizations such as the USAF’s Air Combat Command (ACC), the Navy’s Fleet Forces
Command (FFC), the Army’s Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), and the Marine
Corps’ Combat Development Command (MCCDC).
Authorities
Players concluded that having the ability to change mission, time, and force (e.g., ‘TACONplus’) at the tactical level enabled commanders to rapidly respond and adapt to a wide range of
missions across the JOA. ‘TACON-plus’ becomes increasingly important when operating in a
communications denied or degraded environment. During game play, Tier 3 commanders
routinely delegated ‘TACON-plus’ authority to Tier 4 Commanders because they had perfect
situational awareness of the battlespace and could coordinate with their peers in real-time. This
allowed them to quickly adjust, fulfill new requirements, and shift forces to mitigate threats.
However, several players noted that ‘TACON-plus’ may have served as a “crutch” to
compensate for the lack of cross-domain expertise required to establish CJTUs during game play.
On several occasions, Tier 4 execution of combat and sustainment missions became misaligned
with Tier 3 operational plans. To address this, some participants emphasized that operational
commanders should retain operational control of forces and identify specific conditions or
criteria (e.g., communications are denied with higher authority; time, space, or missions) for
delegating ‘TACON-plus’ to tactical commanders. As one player noted, “OPCON seems right
for the CCs, with, for the Maritime Command being vested in the senior officer afloat - in this
construct the CJTUs acts as Officer in Tactical Command with freedom to change or modify
missions as operational circumstances dictate.”
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Players concluded that the CJFICC will need to acquire permissions prior to conflict to
effectively employ cyber and space capabilities to gain and maintain domain access in Phases 0
and 1. They posited that significant changes to policy and doctrine would need to occur for this
to come to fruition. As one player noted, “Cyber and space within the CJFICC will need
permissions prior to conflict or it will have a hard time completing its tasks.” Acquiring these
permissions requires close and continuous coordination and cooperation between national
agencies, the combatant commander, JTF Commander, and the CJFICC, as well as tactical cyber
forces embedded into CJTUs.
Players concluded that developing a shared understanding of ROE at the tactical level becomes
more critical when planning and executing cross-domain operations in a communications denied
or degraded environment. They noted that XDOCEs could play a role in facilitating this
understanding with peers and subordinates prior to and during a conflict. Finally, players
emphasized that overcoming culture and doctrine barriers requires joint commanders at every
level to establish a shared understanding of each service’s viewpoint and act from a common set
of joint principles that guide the delegation of increased authorities to tactical commanders
executing missions in an A2/AD environment.
PDMA: Planning and Directing XDO in an A2/AD Environment
Players indicated that commanders at all levels of the C2 system need a shared understanding of
the JTF’s and component commander’s overall plans (e.g., CONOPS and scheme of maneuver),
as well as their intent and guidance. Moreover, roles and responsibilities and authorities across
Tier 3 and 4 commanders were often unclear to players. The lack of information sharing up,
down, and across the C2 system, as well as insufficient detail in both plans and commander’s
intent and guidance were highlighted by players as the primary barriers to achieving this shared
understanding across the joint force. Within each campaign phase, players highlighted the need
to develop a shared understanding of the sequence of operational objectives to achieve the JTF
commander’s desired end-state and the sequence of cross-domain actions to achieve each
objective. As one player noted:
“The CJTU idea is a good solution for a communications degraded environment
where clear Lines of Operations and operational tasks exist within the context of
the Commander’s campaign plan. However, since the campaign plan was unclear
(e.g., phase triggers, end states, transition points, task organizations), the logic
for having CJTUs was lost.”
Prior to executing turn zero, the JTF Commander and his component commanders met face-toface for an hour to develop the campaign plan. During this meeting, the JTF Commander
discussed priority and level of effort, primary and intermediate objectives, sequencing of actions,
and encouraged commanders to discuss their ideas and disseminate plans and guidance at the 60
percent level, rather than waiting for the 100% solution. One player later noted, “By the
Admiral’s guidance and intent ...we anticipated bad comms, and we anticipated that Tier 4 had
better SA. A 60 percent plan is better than a 100 percent plan too late.” While component
commanders and their staffs had access to the broad campaign plan created from the initial
planning session, they tended not to share it with their Tier 4 subordinates. As one Tier 4 player
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noted, “Without a clear understanding of where the CJTF was moving in that - and future moves, long-term unity of effort will not be accomplished.”
There was a clear disconnect between Tier 3 and Tier 2 commanders related to prioritizing
missions and level of effort across Tier 3 commanders. Tier 3 commanders looked to the Tier 2
Commander to prioritize current and future missions and weight of effort, while the Tier 2
Commander directed Tier 3 Commanders to prioritize their missions and efforts based on the
overall plan. Players often cited the need to better understand the scheme of maneuver or
CONOPS of each component commander, most notably the CJFSCC and CJFICC. Developing
and maintaining this shared understanding may result in less intervention being required by
higher headquarters to arbitrate competition of resources between Tier 3 commanders and
potentially Tier 4 commanders. Planning and executing cross- domain operations in a
communications denied or degraded environment also places greater emphasis on identifying
and prioritizing information requirements to support commanders at each level. This assertion is
best reflected by the following player comment:
“Ironic that now that we want to collaborate more, we won’t have comms. Our
best tool is our adaptability to the environment ...You’re going to have limited
widows of communication so talk to your teams and figure out what you want to
get across and to whom ...if you have an idea that someone else is better suited to
complete a task, then turn to your boss and tell them that you think they should
offer it to someone else.”
The conditions created during the game to degrade communications between commands often
resulted in confusion and tension between players, as expected. Turn Reports sent from Tier 4 to
higher headquarters and Integrated Tasking Orders sent from Tier 3 to subordinates were often
late, missing, or inaccurate. As one player noted, “ITOs were often reworked at Tier 4 because
assets had moved and weren’t able to accomplish the mission given due to
range/fuel/sustainment.” This prevented Tier 3 commanders from developing a shared
understanding of Blue-Red force laydown and the results of past combat and sustainment
missions in order to accurately develop future plans and orders. Lastly, players advocated for an
ITO that provides awareness of requirements across the force to support intelligence analysis,
targeting, apportionment, and execution. One player noted, “We have to adjust things on the fly
because there isn’t a common ITO at the Tier 3 level that they can share with us. If we could get
the CJFACC/CJFMCC picture early on, it would preclude us attempting to do this on our own
through personal networking.”
Planning and intent and guidance were discussed in 33% of the qualitative data coded and
analyzed. This observation is not surprising since planners and operators rely on intent and
guidance from higher authority to execute missions. The players offered that planners at every
level of command - perhaps most importantly at the Tier 4 level - need a clear and common
understanding of the JTF and Functional Component Commanders’ intent and their Concept of
Operations across the campaign. Planning and executing cross-domain operations in an A2/AD
environment places greater emphasis on commanders, starting at the JTF level, to prioritize
missions and level of effort across the force, prioritize and sequence cross-domain actions and
effects, identify the degree of latitude in departure from orders, delineate authorities and
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responsibilities between commanders, and discuss what to do in the event of a communications
failure. As one player noted,
“We believe we have a need and right to increasingly available real-time
information and we are modifying our processes to flexible but vulnerable “just
in time” mechanisms. If we don’t have a solid backup plan and mechanisms
(and trained people to use this plan), we will be dead in the water.”
In a communications denied or degraded environment, prioritizing missions and level of
effort becomes increasingly important for tactical commanders. As one Tier 4 player noted,
“If there is one thing the Tier 3 could provide it would be the weight of effort. If we can focus on
specific missions, we will figure out what we need. We’re getting ITOs where everything is
wrong and if you have given us the authorities, give me the weight of effort.” Continuously
requesting approval increases time spent planning, directing, monitoring, and assessing
operations in a time compressed decision cycle. As one player noted, “We (Tier 4) felt we had
enough authorities, but as we tried to cross authorities (CJFACC/CJFMCC) we had issues
because we needed to check with Tier 3. Trying to change priority levels in real time is
challenging and limited our ability to achieve our objectives.”
Players recognized that clarifying intent and guidance becomes increasingly difficult in a
communications denied or degraded environment so it is critical that commanders and their
staffs develop a shared understanding with their superiors, subordinates and peers prior to a
conflict. As a result, players identified the need to educate and train leaders at all levels of
command to practice writing and interpreting effective intent and guidance through joint
education and training exercises. As one player noted:
“Clear and concise phrasing of Command intent is an essential skill to enable
mission command…we may need to reach back to some of the great
commanders of the past and understand how they phrased their orders something perhaps that we have forgotten in recent years when we have been
able to saturate our subordinates with plans, lists and spreadsheets.”
Finally, players concluded that intent and guidance should discuss “domain hopping” or the “Red
and Blue trip wires” that would cause horizontal and vertical escalation across domains, and
Blue actions to deescalate or deter further RED escalation within each domain. One player said,
“Give them (subordinate and peer commanders) the off ramp to STOP, down to setting-up
conditions for freedom of maneuver…” Players noted that future analysis and gaming
efforts are warranted to explore how operational deterrence and escalation of actions across
all five domains – land, air, maritime, space, and cyberspace interrelate against an advanced
A2/AD adversary.
Players concluded that current C2 processes and products (e.g., control orders and tasking
orders) at the Tier 3 and 4 levels are insufficient to coordinate cross-domain requirements,
effects, and capabilities to prevent fratricide and mitigate mission overlaps and gaps. They
emphasized that commanders at all levels of command must develop and maintain a common
understanding of all five domains on a near-real time basis and possess the expertise internally to
their staff to monitor and assess cross-domain operations. Players concluded that cross-domain
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based assessments, control orders, and tasking orders should be developed to compensate for the
lack of cross-domain products in place today. They also emphasized that common indicators or
measures of effectiveness should be developed to assess the effects of cross-domain operations
on mission accomplishment.
Specifically, players noted that current battlespace control measures, such as the Air Control
Order (ACO) and Waterspace Management Plan, are necessary but probably insufficient to
provide commanders with the required battlespace control required to fight effectively in all five
domains without significant fratricide. Each domain will require control orders, and these orders
will need to be integrated and made available to every functional component – and their
subordinate commanders – who have forces operating in those domains. While current service
and joint planning processes do not prevent planners from taking a domain-based approach to
campaign planning, with a focus on domain access and the ability to project power to achieve
effects, participants suggested that current planning processes at the Tier 3 and 4 levels should be
modified to include the use of cross-domain assessments. While XDOCEs at each level of
command would most likely perform these functions, players agreed that tactical commanders
assume more responsibility to monitor and assess domain access and risk in an A2/AD
environment.
Even though the game chat function, like other communications paths, experienced delays due to
enemy action, the Tier 3 players continued to rely on it to coordinate plan, direct, monitor, and
assess cross-domain operations throughout the game. Players concluded that chat provided the
high-level of communication and coordination necessary to prevent fratricide and improve multidomain awareness at the Tier 3 level. They noted that improving access and interoperability
between service chat forums is paramount to rapid decision-making in a high-paced A2/AD
environment. Players agreed that Tier 2, 3, and 4 XDOCEs and traditional planners should
operate within the same chat forum to prevent overlaps and gaps in mission planning and build
broader multi-domain awareness.
XDO C2 IMPLICATIONS FOR INTELLIGENCE
While not an area of focus in the game, an effort was made to examine the impact that XDO
C2, in particular the 4 new attributes, would have on existing intelligence processes and
procedures. Resulting from that effort, players noted that collecting, analyzing, and
disseminating relevant, timely, and actionable intelligence to joint planners and operators
becomes problematic when communications are denied and degraded. They concluded that
current intelligence processes and command relationships may be insufficient to effectively
support cross-domain planning at the tactical and operational levels, as well as planning and
directing intelligence operations. Players emphasized that an overreliance on national
intelligence products and platforms lengthens the time required for decision-making and
places forces in theater at a disadvantage. The genesis and implication of this assertion is
best characterized by the following player quote:
“This is borne of decades of information superiority, permissive environments,
and CONUS as a sanctuary. We’ll need to go “back to the future” and start to
live with denied comms, unavailable Intel, and providing initiative via mission
command to lower level commanders. The ISR / Intel ‘Monster’, as it
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currently exists, will not be able to properly function in a contested
environment.”
To mitigate this shortfall, players concluded that CJTU Commanders should maintain
organic tactical ISR capabilities to collect, analyze, and disseminate information and
intelligence to provide tactical indications and warnings and force protection intelligence to
enable CJTU Commanders to conduct cross-domain operations across a range of missions.
They highlighted the need to identify intelligence and information requirements of the
XDOCE, CJTU, CJFICC, and CJFSCC, how each of the services would integrate national
and theater intelligence capabilities, and who retains command authority of service and
theater ISR assets to support the four C2 attributes. Players also emphasized that current
intelligence assessments and estimates of adversary intentions, capabilities, and COAs may need
to be refined and tailored to meet operational and tactical commanders’ needs. Given the need
for intelligence support at each level of command, players suggested that intelligence planners
should be fully integrated with the XDOCE, CJTU, CJFICC, and CJFSCC to support the
development of the overall campaign plan, desired cross-domain effects, and cross-domain
measures of mission success. It was assumed that standardizing intelligence protocols, processes,
and procedures will help intelligence planners identify intelligence requirements, plan and direct
intelligence operations, process and analyze information, and produce and disseminate the
intelligence products needed to effectively support the XDOCE, CJTU, CJFICC, and CJFSCC.
Finally, players emphasized that significant changes to service and joint doctrine, education,
training, and career progression would be necessary to support cross-domain planning at the
tactical and operational levels, as well as planning and directing intelligence operations. They
highlighted that intelligence planners need to develop a broader and deeper level of joint
expertise and experience related to joint intelligence capabilities and limitations, joint campaign
planning and design, and how an adversary would deny friendly forces sanctuary and freedom of
maneuver by employing cross-domain operations to disrupt, destroy, and defeat friendly forces
within the operational environment. Players posited that developing and maintaining a cadre of
joint intelligence planners and operators that specialize in supporting XDOCE planning and
CJTU operations requires joint education and training earlier in their careers. This expertise not
only supports the development of intelligence processes and products, but it may help
intelligence planners challenge current planning assumptions and provide alternative
perspectives.
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V. Conclusions and Recommendations
While the ASB concept highlights the need to command and control cross-domain operations
which are joint, networked, and integrated, no organizational structure is proposed; only the
requirement that any suitable structure must be capable of tight, real-time coordination.
Establishing unity of effort among joint and combined forces engaged in cross-domain
operations against an advanced A2/AD adversary can be complex and challenging. Doing so in a
communications degraded or denied environment requires commanders to exercise authority and
direction over assigned and attached forces in real time while critical information, systems and
services are reduced or prevented. To attain the level of speed and coordination required to
outpace the adversary, a commander must be able to quickly direct and control forces operating
in the air, maritime, land, space and cyberspace domains.
Hard choices must be made in allocating limited resources while executing joint cross-domain
operations in an A2/AD environment, and the same is true when it comes to continuing to
develop and explore the concept of XDO. Therefore, the joint community should officially
designate a lead organization responsible for XDO development and implementation. While this
has been de facto the ASB Office, the joint community should determine whether they or another
service or joint organization, such as the Joint Staff J7, is best suited to officially lead this effort.
This organization should develop an XDO Concept document in order to build a common
understanding of what cross-domain operations are, why they are important, and the challenges
of conducting them. Such a concept document should provide the justification for XDO C2 and
the associated CONOPS. Concurrently, that lead should oversee the continued development of
the XDO C2 CONOPS, to include the incorporation of the recommendations contained in this
report.
Regarding the 4 C2 attributes, whose examination was the focus of this year’s Global effort:
Q

The CJFICC should be implemented now, but solely as a Cyber Component
Commander, under the lead of USCYBERCOM, and leveraging the results of other
ongoing Cyber C2 efforts. In addition, work should continue to evaluate whether the
Space domain and/or Information Operations would benefit from a dedicated
component commander.

Q

Both the XDOCE and CJTU should be pursued through the development of detailed
implementation plans that include incorporation into joint and combined war games and
exercises (Both of these attributes, along with the CJFICC, were intended to be
examined in the Air Force’s Unified Engagement’14 Title 10 War Game, which took
place in Hawaii in January, 2015).

Q

The CJFSCC is not ready to move forward, as it requires further evaluation to determine
whether it contains sufficient utility to warrant further development and implementation.
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VI. Annexes and Supplemental Data
ANNEX A: PLAYER MANNING BY CELL

Billet

Rank

Service

Country

Command

CJTF CDR

RADM

USN

US

COMNAVSURFLANT

Deputy CJTF CDR

RDML

USN

US

INSURV

CJTF XDOCE

CAPT

USN

US

OPNAV N3N5- ASB

CJTF Air SME

Wg Cdr

RAF

UK

RAF Air Warfare Centre

CJTF Air SME

Col

USAF

US

HQ AF/CVAR

CJTF Cyber SME

CAPT

USN

US

Joint Staff, J5 Cyber Policy Division

CJTF Intel SME

CIV

USN

US

Naval War College

CJTF XO

MAJ

USA

US

TRADOC

CJTF Maritime SME

CIV

USCG

US

USCG HQ

CJTF Maritime SME

CDR

USN

US

COMUSFLTFORCOM

CJTF Land SME

CAPT

USA

US

EWCT/Futures Directorate

CJTF SOF SME

CIV

DOD

US

USSOCOM

MCC

Capt

RN

UK

UK Maritime Warfare Centre

MCC Maritime SME

CAPT

USN

US

OPNAV N3N5- ASB

MCC Maritime SME

CAPT

JMSDF

JPN

Maritime Staff Office/JMSDF

MCC Maritime SME

Cdr

RN

UK

UK Maritime Warfare Centre

MCC Naval Intel SME

CDR

USN

US

NAVCYBERFOR/IDFOR

MCC Naval Sub SME

CMDR

RAN

AUS

UK Maritime Warfare Centre

MCC Naval TACAIR

CDR

USN

US

OPNAV N98

MCC Air XDOCE

WGCDR

RAAF

AUS

USAF ACC / 505th Training Group

MCC Cyber XDOCE

Maj

MoD

UK

Joint Force Cyber Group

MCC Land XDOCE

CIV

USA

US

FWD, ARCIC, TRADOC

MCC Maritime
XDOCE
MCC Space XDOCE

LCDR

USN

US

COMSEVENTHFLT

Maj

USAF

US

HQ USAF / SAF-SP

ACC

CIV

USAF

US

OPNAV N3N5- ASB

ACC Air SME

LtCol

USAF

US

AFGSC/A8P

ACC Air SME

CIV

USAF

US

HQ AF / A5XS Wargaming

A-1

U.S. Naval War College Global 2014 Report

Billet

Rank

Service

Country

Command

ACC Air SME

LCDR

JMSDF

JPN

Japan MSDF LNO OPNAV N51

ACC Air SME

LCDR

USN

US

NWDC

ACC Air Intel SME

Maj

USAF

US

AF/A2D

ACC Army Msl Def
SME
ACC Air XDOCE

CIV

USA

US

Army SMDC/ARSTRAT

CIV

USN

US

NWDC

ACC Cyber XDOCE

LCdr

RCN

CAN

CNavy/Director of Naval Strategy

ACC Land XDOCE

Lt Col

RM

UK

UK Joint Forces Command

ACC Maritime
XDOCE
ACC Space XDOCE

CDR

JMSDF

JPN

NWDC JMSDF PEP

CIV

USAF

US

HQ USAF/A5XS

ICC

CAPT

USN

US

FCC/C10F

ICC Intel SME

CDR

USN

US

FCC/C10F

ICC Joint Cyber SME

CIV

USA

US

Army Cyber Center of Excellence

ICC Joint Cyber SME

Lt Col

USMC

US

MARFORCYBERCOM

ICC USAF Space
SME
ICC USN Space SME

Col

USAF

US

PACAF/A3/6

LCDR

USN

US

COMTENTHFLT/FLTCYBERCOM

ICC Air XDOCE

Col

JASDF

JPN

Air Staff Office/Japan Air Self Defense Force

ICC Land XDOCE

CIV

USA

US

ARCIC/JACD

ICC Maritime XDOCE

CMDR

RAN

AUS

Royal Australian Navy

LCC

COL

USA

US

Mission Command Battle Lab

LCC Ground Intel
SME
LCC Land Domain
SME
SOF SME

CIV

USA

US

US Army TRADOC/DCS, G-2

Lt Col

USMC

US

HQMC I&L

MAJ

USA

US

SOCOM

LCC Air XDOCE

Lcol

RCAF

CAN

1 Canadian Air Division HQ

LCC Cyber XDOCE

CMDR

RAN

AUS

Royal Australian Navy

LCC Maritime XDOCE

Cdr

RCN

CAN

CNavy /Director Naval Strategy

LCC Space XDOCE

MAJ

RCAF

CAN

SAF/SP

SCC

LTC

USA

US

CADD / MC CoE

SCC Air Log SME

CIV

USAF

US

AMC

SCC Combat Eng
SME
SCC Ground Log
SME
SCC Intel SME

CDR

USN

US

NECC

CIV

USA

US

US Army TRADOC

CIV

USMC

US

MCIA

SCC Joint Log SME

Cdr

RN

UK

British Defence Staff

SCC Naval Log SME

CAPT

USN

US

OPNAV N41

SCC Naval Log SME

LCDR

USN

US

COMPACFLT
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Billet

Rank

Service

Country

Command

SCC Air XDOCE

LtCol

USAF

US

ACC/A3F Joint Integration

SCC Land XDOCE

LTC

AA

AUS

HQ TRADOC

SCC Maritime
XDOCE
ACC Tier 4

CDR

USN

US

NAVCENT / CMF

CIV

USAF

US

AF/A8X

ACC Tier 4

LtCol

USAF

US

Air Combat Command

ACC Tier 4

CIV

USAF

US

Air Combat Command

ACC Tier 4

Lt Col

USMC

US

OPNAV N98

ICC Tier 4

LtCol

USAF

US

AF/A5XS

ICC Tier 4

LtCol

USAF

US

HAF/A3S

LCC Tier 4

Maj

USAF

US

PACAF A3/6/C2

LCC Tier 4

MAJ

USA

US

TRADOC, JACD

MCC Tier 4

LCDR

USN

US

COMSUBLANT

MCC Tier 4

LT

USN

US

MCWL Wargaming

MCC Tier 4

Lt Col

USMC

US

CD&I / SID

MCC Tier 4

CMDR

RAN

AUS

Royal Australian Navy

SCC Tier 4

CIV

USAF

US

AMC/Strategic Planning Division

SCC Tier 4

LCDR

USN

US

USFF N413

HHQ

CDR

USN

US

JS J7

HHQ

CIV

USCG

US

USCG HQ

HHQ

CIV

DoD

US

JS J7 FJFD JWD

HHQ

CIV

DoD

US

JS J7 JWD
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